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The new national security strategy will have both short and
long-range effects on all branches of the military. This requires
a close examination of the implications that such dramatic changes
could have on the military and their ability to respond to the
broad spectrum of crises that could occur in today's dynamic
political situation. Although the threat from the Soviet Union has
diminished and while no one seriously believes that the U.S. and
the Soviet Union will engage in conflict, especially on Soviet
soil, the need still exists to examine Soviet doctrine and
warfighting capabilities in relation to U.S. capabilities and
strategies. We need to study Soviet antilanding doctrine because
of the possibility of U.S. forces encountering Soviet-trained
enemies or the remote possiblity of contingency operations against
the USSR in regional/local wars. Finally, it is necessary for U.S.
strategic planners to continuously track Soviet antilanding
concepts in the unlikely event of a reconstitution scenario
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The purpose of this thesis is to determine the necessity
for the continued study of Soviet defensive doctrine given the
recent changes brought about by the new national security
strategy. The new national security strategy shifted the
focus of U.S. defense effort away from an era of concentrating
on a single threat, the Soviet Union. Does this imply that we
ignore Soviet military capabilities and political intentions,
or should we continue to assess these capabilities and
intentions before making any major course changes in our own
programs?
The new national security strategy has focused the United
States defenses on the ability to provide deterrence,
peacetime presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. This
propels America's armed forces into a new era that requires
the maintenance of a force structure that is both flexible and
mobile in nature. This new force structure must also maintain
the ability to perform routine presence or respond to crises
dependent on the tasking.
The national strategy, to remain credible, requires a
force capability applicable across the broad spectrum of
conflict which is joint in nature. The Marine Corps has
developed a force structure and a concept of operations that
maximizes their warfighting capabilities while still
addressing the missions of the new national security strategy
and current force level cuts.
Amphibious forces can clearly play a role in this new
national security strategy given their inherent flexibility
and mobility. Maneuver strategy affords amphibious forces an
enhanced ability to respond to crises and conflicts while
facing technological advances in weaponry and asymmetrical
forces. As such, they can have a significant influence in
strategy by virtue of their diversionary capability and can
play a large role as a contingency force in this new national
security strategy.
The end of the cold war signaled a new era in not only
United States military policy, but Soviet Union military
policy as well. The political and economic implications of
this new Soviet era is shifting the impetus of the Soviet
military away from an offensive military strategy and towards
a border, including maritime, defense military. The Soviet
military commands a formidable coastal defense force that
consists of both ground and naval forces and is an integral
part of the Soviet military and political "defensive"
doctrine
.
The first section of this thesis examines the significant
effect that the new national security strategy will have on
force structure and the associated roles and missions of U.S.
military forces. The paper then examines the impact of this
new strategy on the U.S. Marine Corps with it's amphibious
force capability and how the Marines are moving to meet this
new new strategy.
The next section analyzes the forces and capabilities of
the Soviet Union's antilanding defenses. It provides an
overview of the type of defense the U.S. could expect from
either Soviet or Soviet-trained forces.
The final section contains the assessment of whether the
need still exists for continued study of Soviet military
policy by strategic planners.
II. AMERICA'S NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
A . INTRODUCTION
The Cold War is over and President Bush has announced a
new national security strategy which focuses the Armed Forces
on peacetime presence and contingency-type operations. 1 The
new national security strategy will have both short and long-
range effects on all branches of the military and will require
a close examination of the implications that such dramatic
changes could have on the various branches of the military and
their ability to respond to the broad spectrum of crises that
could occur in today's dynamic political situation.
This chapter will examine the effect of the new national
security strategy on America's future force structure and the
roles and missions of U.S. Marine Corps amphibious forces in
contingency operations. Primary attention will be drawn to
the ability of amphibious forces to deter aggression, maintain
stability, encourage and sustain reform, and to respond to the
complete range of scenarios.
1
"Remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute
symposium", Office of the Press Secretary (Aspen, Colorado),
The White House, August 2, 1990, 1.
B. ASPEN SPEECH
With President Bush's Aspen Institute speech of August 2,
1990, America began a movement towards a new national strategy-
requiring a force structure with the ability to provide a
regional peacetime presence and contingency response. The
current active force structure can expect to be approximately
25 percent smaller by 1995 placing America's armed forces at
their lowest level since 1950.
In his speech Bush stated:
"What matters now is how we reshape the forces that
remain. Our new strategy must provide the framework to
guide our deliberate reductions to no more than the forces
we need to guard our enduring interests - the forces to
exercise interests - the forces to exercise forward
presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises,
to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces
should this be needed. What we need are not merely
reductions, but restructuring." 2
This force restructuring will require a close eye on our
defense policy thought and planning given the velocity with
which political situations are changing in the world today.
While the Marine Corps/military forces can provide immediate
response to many contingencies with little or no warning, the
new force structure would require six or more months to
respond to another contingency such as "Desert Storm. " The
United States military must focus on readiness and rapid
response with forces which can provide the U.S. with global
reach. While conflicts at the strategic level of conflict
2 Ibid.
(i.e., World War II) still requires allied support, and
operational level conflicts (i.e. Desert Storm) would require
host nation support, the tactical level of conflict remains
the only unilateral capability maintained by the U.S.
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney recognizes the continuing
importance of maintaining a viable force structure despite the
proposed decreases in U.S. forces. In a speech prepared for
delivery at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, on March
21, 1991 Secretary Cheney acknowledged the necessity of
maintaining traditional strengths such as logistics, control
of the sea, command of the air, mobility , and the capability
to conduct large armored land assaults as recently
demonstrated in Iraq. 3
This requires the maintenance of a force structure that is
both flexible and mobile in nature with the ability perform
routine presence or to respond to crises by reinforcing
forward-based units through the concept of sequencing follow-
on troops from any branch of the military.
C. A NEW ERA FOR AMERICA'S ARMED FORCES
The Aspen Institute speech provided renewed impetus to the
issue about the roles and missions of not only the Marine
Corps, but the other branches of the military as well. Prior
3 Remarks by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney at Walsh
Lecture at Georgetown University, Washington, DC. Thursday,
March 21, 1991. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs) News Release . Washington, D.C.
to "Desert Storm" the debate was heating up between the
various branches of the military concerning roles and dollars
and among critics in Washington who stated:
"...the Pentagon should review the assignment of
missions to the services, largely set four decades ago,
with an eye to meeting goals more efficiently." 4
The role for the military in contingency-type operations
and peacetime presence is complicated. It must depend on
either host nation support, which risks political problems,
MAGTF's, or on lightly equipped troops that can respond more
rapidly. But the limited weight of equipment that can be
transported by these "light divisions" may not be enough to
meet the threat
.
In March 1990 a hearing before the House Armed Services
Committee was called by Les Aspin, chairman of the panel, to
begin debate on "the right mix of forces" for operations in
Third World countries. 5
The Army and Air Force each based their claim to be the
U.S. primary force for contingency operations on the speed
with which their forces can respond to a crisis and the wide
assortment of combat forces that could be employed. General
4 Gordon, Michael R. The New York Times . "Pentagon Faces
Battle on Reshaping Military for Changing World." May 20,
1990. B12.
5 Gordon, Michael R. The New York Times . "Split Between
Army and Marines Surfaces in Debate on 3d World." March 15,
1990. B6.
Carl Vuono, the former Army Chief of Staff, stated that future
conflicts in the Third World will require:
"...the overwhelming application of combat power.
The Army can place substantial combat power on the
ground anywhere in the world." 6
The Marine Corps, on the other hand, argued that the
Navy/Marine Corps team provides the U.S. with a flexible and
sustainable force and the means to respond to contingencies
anywhere in the world utilizing forward deployed and
prepositioned assets.
"I think that the Army Contingency Corps that is
being advertised as a forcible entry capability is
light enough to get there but just light enough to get
itself into trouble, said Brig. Gen. Sheehan, USMC
.
I see less of a need for a contingency corps than the
Army would advertise. You are going to need a healthy




The struggles between the various branches of the military
are primarily accomplished by each service promoting itself as
the best provider of the conventional forces required in what
they foresee as the future defense policy of contingency
response. These are legitimate debates and future debates of
this type are bound to increase in number and intensity as the
different services compete for parts of the shrinking defense
budget, but for the time being, a truce has been called
6 Ibid., Bl.
7 Gordon, Michael R. The New York Times . "Army, Facing
Cuts, Reported Seeking to Reshape Itself." December 12, 1989.
Al.
between the services. As stated by General Carl Mundy, the
new Marine Corps commandant
:
"The U.S. Army-Marine Corps debate over which force is
better suited to quickly respond to world conflicts has
ended. Cooperation is the wave of the future." 8
D. THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The fundamental role of America's armed forces as outlined
in the new national security strategy is strategic deterrence,
forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. 9 While
these tenets will remain constant, the force structure and the
means by which the U.S. accomplishes these roles is subject to
change. This entails the development of a military strategy
and force structure that is responsive to the emerging
security environment. The global interests and
responsibilities maintained by the U.S. as the worlds lone
superpower will require a military force of wide-ranging
capabilities while enduring at least a twenty-five percent cut
in the military budget.
In light of the changing threat and the reduction of
forces across the board, the U.S. is already reducing those
8 Caleb Baker. "New Marine Chief Urges More Ties With
Army" in Defense News . September 30, 1991. p. 38.
The White House, National Security Strategy of the
United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, August 1991), p. 25.
forces focused on the Soviet threat. 10 The era of focusing
the majority of U.S. defense efforts on a single threat or a
single region of the world is no longer considered a viable
option. We must carefully, however, still assess both Soviet
military capabilities and political intentions before making
any major course changes in our own programs. It must be
noted that while political intentions can change overnight,
force structure, once relinquished, takes much longer to
rebuild.
The U.S. historical reliance on the seas for economic and
security requirements, coupled with the possibility of
conflicts along the littoral, necessitates the development of
a strategy that is maritime in nature. As General Colin L.
Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated before
the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate on 21
February 1991:
"Control of critical sea, air and space lines of
communication underwrites our other strategic concepts.
Control of these lines is essential to our ability to
protect global U.S. interests and to project power,
reinforce, resupply, and gain access. Maritime
superiority gives us the capability to achieve this
control and provides our National Command Authorities with
a wide range of options during peace, crisis, or war." 11
10 The terms Soviet and Soviet Union were retained in
this thesis pending the adoption of a final political
settlement and redesignation.
11 Statement of General Colin L. Powell Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff before the Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate 21 February 1991. p. 7.
10
The expected decrease in overseas bases generally
(recognizing that new presence is being constructed in the
Persian Gulf) coupled with an expected increase in the need
for independent action, underscores the need for a strategy
that is consistent with our national character and
requirements
.
As noted by former Marine Corps Commandant General A.M. Gray:
"The decline in overseas bases and the need for vital
resources in the third world drives us toward the
development of a strategy that is maritime in
character. " 12
A modest level of U.S. military presence - principally
maritime - will be essential to preserve stability, encourage
democracy, and deter aggression. 13 The presence of these
maritime forces will provide a clear message concerning U.S.
regional interests and can foster regional stability.
The preservation of a stable world environment through the
maintenance of credible military forces and strong alliances
will continue to remain crucial to the survival of our Nation
and our political and economic well-being. To be credible,
the national strategy must be a joint strategy, which requires
a force capability applicable across the broad spectrum of
conflict. This will require not only forces capable of rapid
12 Gordon. NYT . "Split Between Army and Marines
Surfaces." Bl
.
13 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991 Joint Military Net
Assessment, March 1991.
11
response, but the capability of building up forces in theater
through the concept of sequencing.
The importance of peacetime measures to deter these
regional conflicts, instabilities, and terrorism will
certainly expand as U.S. military resources are reduced in
accordance with the new national security strategy. The
importance of peacetime measures in deterring aggression and
defusing crises will inevitably grow as military resources
continue to shrink. 14
E. THE U.S. MARINE CORPS AND THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY
The withdrawal of U.S. forces from forward-deployed
regions of the World establishes the need for a means of
forward presence. "Forward presence provides visible
deterrence, preserves regional stability, and promotes U.S.
influence and access." 15 The application of forward presence
is no more credible, nor achievable, than with the U.S.
Navy/Marine Corps team with their inherent mobility and
flexibility to respond to various crises.
Forward-deployed naval forces are particularly well-suited
for limiting the expansion of a crisis and facilitating a
14 Ibid.
15
"Statement of General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate, Washington, DC, 21 February 1991," As
delivered, 19 pp.
12
return to normalcy. They can move into position rapidly and
in strength without violating territorial borders or raising
national sensitivities over territorial sovereignty. If the
situation warrants, Navy and Marine forces, in concert with
those of allies can apply appropriate force to protect our
common interests. Once the crisis is resolved, naval forces
can be withdrawn unilaterally without giving the appearance of
retreat. As stated by LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC(Ret):
"
. . .maritime forces constitute an in-being capability that
is ideal for deterrence, crisis control, or forceful
action ... it is only with amphibious forces that presence
can be established ashore." 16
The unique demands of this new national security strategy
require that the Navy/Marine Corps team be innovative in their
approach while placing an emphasis on conventional presence
and crisis response. The key aspects of the Navy/Marine Corps
revised strategy must be readiness, presence, mobility,
sustainability, and the concept of sequencing not only
Marines, but Army and Air Force follow-on forces as well.
The U.S. Marine Corps amphibious forces maintain the
ability to be "in area" during a crisis to inhibit possible
escalation of hostilities. If the situation deteriorates
amphibious forces can act decisively to deter further
escalation and failing all else they can provide a "foothold"
for the sequencing of follow-on forces if the situation
16 Trainor, Bernard E. "A Force 'Employment' Capability 1
in Marine Corps Gazette . May 1990. p. 30.
13
results in a major confrontation requiring a greater American
response. Sequencing provides the National Command Authority
with the capability to respond to crises with a small, capable
force and, if the situation necessitates, maintain the ability
to secure air bases, ports, or safe zones for the augmentation
of heavier follow-on forces as illustrated in the scenario
section of this chapter. As Brigadier General Charles E.
Wilhelm, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Missions
and Applications for the Marine Corps stated:
"As far as forcible entry, sustainability and
independence from forward bases, naval forces have
far, far greater utility than the contingency forces
that I am reading about." 17
F. CONCLUSIONS
Amphibious warfare is probably the most complex of all
warfare areas, encompassing land, air, surface and sub-surface
elements. The amphibious force is important instrument of
policy, both politically and militarily, and at the strategic,
operational and tactical levels. By virtue of the mobility,
flexibility and versatility, organic to amphibious forces and
with the ability to launch a tactical/operational landing
force and maneuver from the seaward flank, it is a vital
component of our maritime capability and national security
strategy. It can cover and respond to the complete range of
17 Gordon, Michael R. The New York Times . "Army, Facing
Cuts, Reported Seeking to Reshape Itself." December 12, 1989.
Al.
14
scenarios from forward presence to crisis response and finally
to sustained conflict. It is often the best, and sometimes
the only, way of responding with military force to an unstable
or potentially unstable situation.
While many people have asserted that amphibious operations
are a thing of the past, the fact remains that this type of
operation can achieve objectives at the operational and
tactical levels of war and possibly at the strategic level
with the assets of our allies.
Although Marines maintain an ability at the tactical and
operational level to conduct forcible-entry operations from
the sea, naval expeditionary forces provide not only the
capability needed to rapidly shift from crisis influence to
crisis intervention, but also the means to enable the
introduction of sustainable follow-on forces. Amphibious
operations as a means of maneuver allow U.S. forces to seize
and maintain the initiative by taking the fight to the enemy
at a time and place of their choosing.
It also can not be overlooked that the threat of
amphibious operations also can cause our adversary to deploy
forces in a manner that leaves him vulnerable in other
locations and to other types of military operations as
evidenced in Operation Desert Storm where the Iraqis employed
11 divisions in defense of the coast from the threat of only
18,000 U.S. Marines.
15
President Bush summarized his speech to the Aspen
Institute by stating:
"All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal,
as well as military. The budget constraints we face are
very real, but so, too, is the need to protect the gains
that 40 years of peace through strength have earned us.
The simple fact is this: When it comes to national
security, America can never afford to fail or fall
short. " 18
With the inability to predict Soviet reaction to internal
and external change, the U.S. must maintain a credible
conventional capability to deter aggression, maintain
stability, encourage and sustain reform, and respond to crises
resulting from unforseen circumstances not only in Europe, but
throughout the World.
The question must be asked do we plan for intentions or
for capabilities, and for what threat. To maintain a credible
military the U.S. must not be so nearsighted as to ignore the
significant force and advisory potential maintained by the
Soviets. This paper, while not attempting to focus strictly
on a Soviet threat, seeks to examine one aspect of the U.S.
force structure's capabiliy to respond to contingencies by
examining the potential for Marine Corps amphibious forces to
exploit the coastal defense forces of the Soviet Union.
18




II. THE U.S. MARINE CORPS
Military doctrine and theory is evolutionary and
constantly undergoing change to accommodate new ideas or
technology, or to counter changing threats. It is therefore
not surprising to find or expect significant modifications to
military doctrine and theory in view of the President's Aspen
speech.
The advocacy of maneuver philosophy in Marine Corps
doctrine when combined with the concept of sequencing provides
a means of accomplishing the new national security strategy of
deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and
reconsititution while complying with current force cuts. The
ability of Marine Corps planners to adapt to the policy of
joint force contingency operations in recognition of the
emerging force structures and force strengths will allow the
Marine Corps to move into this new era as the vanguard of
America's new National Security Strategy.
This chapter will examine the force structure of the
Marine Corps, their missions, a brief examination of possible
scenarios, and the Marine Air-Ground Task Force concept of
operations. It will then briefly peruse the concepts of
"maneuver" and "attrition" styles of warfare. The primary
focus of this chapter will be the Marine Corps amphibious
17
capability as an intervention force to provide a balanced
force of combined arms in a variety of crisis situations in
accordance with the new national security strategy.
A. FORCE STRUCTURE
There is no precise model to optimize force structure.
Forces must be multimission, mobile, flexible, and capable of
the precise and discriminate application of military force.
The Marine Corps has developed a force structure that
maximizes their fighting capabilities while still addressing
the current force level cuts, the concept of sequencing, and
the new national security strategy.
Marine operational forces are organized into Marine Air-
Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) under the command of a single
commander from the various combat, combat support, and combat
service support organizations of the Marine Corps. They are
task-organized based on a particular mission consisting of
three basic types of standing MAGTF's that may be formed in
response to operational requirements: MEF, MEB, and MEU.
1. MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (MEF)
The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the largest
and most powerful of the MAGTF's. The MEF is normally built
around a Marine division, aircraft wing, force service support
group, and a surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence
group involving approximately 45,000 troops. The Ground
Combat Element (GCE) of the MEF will normally include a Marine
18
division which is composed of three infantry regiments, an
artillery regiment, an assault amphibian battalion, a combat
engineer battalion, a light armored infantry battalion, a
reconnaissance battalion and a tank battalion consisting
seventy tanks. The Aviation Combat Element is normally a
Marine aircraft wing consisting of fixed-wing/rotary-wing
aircraft, antiair warfare units, air command and control
elements, Marine wing support group, and may include resources
from other aircraft wings for added combat power. The MEF is
capable of conducting a wide range of significant sustained
operations including forcible entry with 60 days of
support. 19 An example of the use of a MEF-sized force in a
wartime scenario could be equated to the force used at Inchon
where the Marine amphibious forces were tasked with seizing
the port of Inchon, the Kimpo airfield, and the city of Seoul
and, in a "joint" operation with the Eighth Army, conducted a
pincher movement to destroy Communist forces. 20 The current
goal of the Marine Corps force structure is to support three
Marine Expeditionary Forces. (FIGURE 1)
19 Marine Air-Ground Task Force Presentation Team Pocket
Guide . The U.S. Marine Corps MAGTF Warfighting Presentation
Team. MCCDC, Quantico, VA. 1 October 1990.
20 Heinl, Robert D. "Inchon, 1950." in Assault from the
Sea . Merrill L. Bartlett editor, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval
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2. MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE (MEB)
The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is an Assault
Echelon (AE) of approximately 14,800 troops normally embarked
aboard Navy amphibious ships capable of amphibious operations
and subsequent operations ashore. A MEB-sized force was
employed during Operation Desert Storm where they conducted
feints along the Kuwaiti coastline and augmented ground
forces. The MEB Ground Combat Element is built around a
reinforced regiment consisting of two to five infantry
battalions, an artillery battalion reinforced, an assault
amphibian company, a combat engineer company, a light armored
infantry company, a reconnaissance company, a tank company
consisting of 17 tanks, and a TOW platoon. The Aviation
Combat Element is a composite Marine aircraft group consisting
of fixed-wing aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, command,
control, and antiair warfare elements, and a Marine Wing
Support Group (MWSG) detachment. It also consists of a
Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG) capable of supporting the
MEB in combat for 3 days without resupply. During potential
crisis situations, a MEB, the smallest unit capable of
forcible entry, may be forward deployed aboard ships for an
extended period to provide rapid response. While the MEB can
be supported from its sea base, facilities ashore or a
combination of both for 30 days, for sustained combat, a
21
larger force is required. 21 The MEB also has an assault
follow-on-echelon (AFOE) which may be embarked on commercial
ships. The current programming goal for amphibious ships for
the U.S. Marine Corps is assault echelons for two and one half
MEB's i.e., one per coast plus training. (FIGURE 2)
3. MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT/SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE
The Marine Expeditionary Unit/Special Operations
Capable (MEU/SOC) is the smallest forward-deployed MAGTF . It
is normally composed of a composite aircraft squadron, a
reinforced infantry battalion without tank support, a MEU
service support group (MSSG) , and consists of approximately
2,350 troops. The MEU/SOC is considered the most responsive
MAGTF and may be designated as the forward echelon of a MEB
since it is sea-based and continuously deployed. The MEU/SOC
deploys with 15 days of sustainment and, while it is not
considered capable of forced entry operations, it is capable
of conducting amphibious operations of limited scope or
provide an immediate reaction capability for relatively
limited combat operations. The MEU/SOC conducted a valuable
mission during Operation Desert Storm through their maritime
intervention role and the securing of Iraqi island outposts.
The MEU/SOC contains a GCE composed of a reinforced infantry
battalion including an artillery battery, an assault amphibian
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armored infantry battalion, a reconnaissance platoon, and an
antitank section. The ACE of the MEU/SOC is composed of a
composite squadron including detachments from a medium
helicopter squadron, heavy helicopter squadron (HMH) , light
attack helicopter squadron (HMLA) , Harrier-V/STOL attack
squadron (VMA) , aerial refueler transport squadron (VMGR) , air
control group (MACG) , and a Marine observation squadron. The
MEU/SOC also contains a combat service support element capable
of providing the full spectrum of combat service support
capabilities. 22 The current goal of the new national
security strategy is only two forward deployed Marine
Expeditionary Units/Special Operations Capable at any one
time. (FIGURE 3)
4 . SCENARIOS
Amphibious forces can clearly play a role in the new
national security strategy given their inherent flexibility
and mobility. They can attain goals at the tactical level of
war, at the operational level of war with host nation support,
and at the strategic level of war given the benefit of allied
support. This paper, for consistency purposes, uses the
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The Soviet Union will remain as the strongest military
force on the Eurasian landmass. 23 While the U.S. must
maintain the conventional capability to globally
counterbalance these forces, conventional war planners will
focus their efforts on the regional contingencies outlined in
the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment .
It is necessary to examine possible scenarios that
could occur in the world involving the Soviet Union, Soviet-
trained forces, or Third World forces and the role that the
Marine amphibious forces would play in the conflict. This
section will provide three possible scenarios, not to be
construed as predictive, where amphibious forces could
contribute an active and influential role in the new national
security strategy.
a. SCENARIO 1
The most likely scenario for Marine amphibious
forces in today's modern battlefield and in light of recent
force level cuts would be in a crisis response or crisis
intervention role against perhaps Soviet-trained forces in the
Third World or Middle East, etc.
The amphibious forces of the U.S. Marine Corps were
some of the first American forces to respond to the
Iraqi/Kuwait crisis and arrive in theater. The rapid response
of the Marine Amphibious Readiness Group (MARG) enabled U.S.
23 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment p. 1-3
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forces to receive advance reconnaissance and intelligence
prior to the conflict, an important mission in today's modern
battlefield.
The ability of amphibious forces to conduct non-
hostile evacuation operations (NEO) in areas of crisis is also
important and was performed by a Marine amphibious ready group
during the Iraq/Kuwait crisis.
While attention was focused on the invasion and eventual
liberation of Kuwait, Navy and Marine Corps units evacuated
civilians from two other hot spots on opposite coasts of
Africa
.
The capability of amphibious forces to secure
access to critical landmasses is essential in crisis response.
The Marines ability to provide this mission was demonstrated
during Desert Storm when the embarked Marines from the Marine
Expeditionary Unit/Special Operations Capable (MEU/SOC)
assaulted the tiny Kuwaiti island Umm al Maradim 12 miles off
the Kuwaiti coast using embarked helicopters, securing a Iraqi
outpost
.
Once a crisis has escalated to conflict the
amphibious capabilities of a Marine Expeditionary Unit sized
amphibious task force maintains the ability to secure an area
for the sequencing of follow-on troops.
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b. SCENARIO 2
Another likely crisis response for which the Marine
Corps amphibious forces would respond would be one like that
witnessed in Operation Desert Storm. A large crisis such as
Operation Desert Storm against Soviet trained forces is not
only possible, but probable given the large number of
countries with whom the Soviets have provided both technical
and military advice.
The U.S. Marine Corps, as part of their total
employment of troops, deployed an amphibious task force of
nearly 18,000 Marines, the largest amphibious force deployment
since World War II. This provided a formidable force that the
Iraqis had to not only acknowledge but prepare for in defense
of their maritime flank.
The Iraqis dedicated eleven divisions, totaling
some 80,000 troops in preparation for an amphibious assault by
18,000 U.S. Marines that was to never come. They were also
forced to garrison troops on Bubiyan and Faylaka Islands, both
of which commanded key sea approaches to vital areas. The
various feints and raids conducted by the amphibious forces
allowed U.S. ground forces to conduct an end-run of Iraqis
forces while the Iraqis prepared for the inevitable assault
from the sea. This is the essence of maneuver warfare.
The defensive formation of the Iraqis was
remarkably similar to Soviet coastal defense strategy. They
utilized mine fields in conjunction with extensive use of
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obstacles. Iraqi forces established six mine fields with an
additional four mine lines with a total of over 1200 mines to
prevent an amphibious assault. They also employed the
extensive and coordinated use of barbed wire, anti-tank and
anti-personnel mines, waterborne obstacles, and beachhead
barriers
.
The Iraqis additionally utilized the Soviet
technique of employing a combat guard or outpost of Iraqi
soldiers on islands and oil-drilling platforms with vital
accesses to the Iraqi shore and employed anti-ship missiles
installations along the coast. While the U.S. delayed
conflict initiation until sufficient forces could be
established in theater, the Iraqis were able to prepare
significant coastal defenses forces due to this delay.
The major disparity between the Iraqis defensive
stance and a Soviet defensive stance was" the obvious lack of
air and sea forces in support of the ground defenses, provided
no air superiority. The U.S. capability to maintain air and
sea control would have provided sufficient gunfire support to
effectively destroy any resistance to the landing.
Despite U.S air and sea supremecy, the significant
use of mines and landing beach obstacles presented enough of
a deterrent to necessitate an over-the-horizon capability.
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C. SCENARIO 3
The least likely scenario for U.S. Marine
intervention forces would be an amphibious assault conducted
in conjunction with a major European-centered global war
against the Soviet Union. The new national security strategy
and the associated Base Force are designed to meet contingency
type responses instead. The old European-centered global war
involving the USSR is assumed to involve a two-year warning
and would allow the reconstitution of U.S. forces.
Despite this concept for reconstitution and allied
support in a European-centered global war effort, amphibious
forces could play an operational or tactical role in a
regional or other local war with the Soviet Union. These
types of contingency operations still are contained in our new
planning scenarios. If these types of operations are
possible, we must realize the large coastline associated with
Russian territory that must be protected by them in any local
war
.
The U.S. Marine Corps also can protect the maritime
flanks of U.S. ground troops and secure strategically
important chokepoints. This also substantiates the need for
amphibious forces
.
The ability to conduct amphibious operations
against a power like the Soviet Union would also require
Carrier Battle Group support of the Amphibious Task Force.
The coastal defense capabilities of the Soviet Navy would
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necessitate that the U.S. maintain not only air superiority
but sea superiority as well in the immediate vicinity of the
amphibious objective area.
As stated by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in
the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment:
"...the Soviet military will remain by a wide margin, the
largest armed force on the continent ... the Soviet ability
to project conventional power beyond its borders will
continue to decline. .. there is enormous uncertainty about
developments inside the Soviet Union and adjacent areas,
and this should be reflected in our planning." 24
5. MISSIONS
While the focus of this paper is on the amphibious
assault capability of the U.S. Marine Corps to respond, to
crisis situations through the conduct of missions such as
amphibious raids, it must be noted that the Marines are not
committed to a strictly amphibious concept. The Marine Corps
views on amphibious warfare are evidenced through somewhat
subtle changes such as the change from Marine Amphibious
Forces to Marine Expeditionary Forces and the term amphibious
warfare was mentioned only once in FMFM 1 Warf ightinq , the new
Marine Corps doctrine. The not so subtle changes evidenced
are the Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS) Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) option and the new national
security strategy with a Base Force Amphibious Force
24 Ibid.
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programming goal of two and one half MEB assault echelons,
down from one and one half Marine Expeditionary Force.
The Marine Corps is dedicated to the amphibious assault
concept only if the mission requires it. The flexibility of
the Marine Corps to respond to different missions with
different forces promotes the Marines as a leading force for
special operations, both to act as a forward presence and for
crisis response, as demonstrated in Lebanon, Vietnam, Grenada,
and most recently Iraq.
The current operational doctrine of the Marine Corps
envisions the concept of "sequencing." Sequencing entails
the use of forward deployed forces for deterrence, stability
and readiness for crisis response. In times of crisis, Marine
forces have the potential to be the first forces to respond or
arrive at the scene. While this may not be the case in all
situations, it can promote the Marine Corps as a leading
element in sequencing through their ability of the MEU/SOC,
the forward element of the MEB, to secure airbases and
seaports providing a means for the augmentation of forces in
theater by airborne and other contingency forces. If the
crisis escalates, the Marine Corps maintains the capability of
forcible entry through the employment of the MEB assault
echelon. This chapter will only deal with the amphibious
capability of the U.S. Marine Corps, not the Maritime
Prepositioned Ships.
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The United States maintains political and economic
interests scattered throughout the world necessitating a force
structure capable of performing a variety of missions both on
land and at sea. The U.S. Marine Corps in its attempt to
maintain its strategic role as a rapid deployment force, has
not fixated itself on a particular mission. Despite certain
doctrinal and operational evolution, the Marines with a
forward looking and flexible nature, will continue to be the
vanguard of crisis response well into the future.
6 . THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE CONCEPT OF AMPHIBIOUS
OPERATIONS
The ability to combine forward-deployed forces,
rapidly-deployable air-lift-configured MAGTFs using
prepositioned combat equipment and supplies, and amphibious
MAGTFs is a crisis response capability that is uniquely
Marine
.
In a sustained conflict, the Marines would fight in
some combination of MEF's and MEB's and if the conflict
escalated, would be dependant on the sequencing of additional
forces. MEU/SOC's by their nature of being forward deployed
in a peacetime presence role, can through crisis response
provide an extremely useful tool in the concept of sequencing.
They can secure selected facilities and key terrain ashore,
thereby expediting the reinforcement of follow-on forces and
saving valuable facilities, such as ports and airfields.
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The adoption of the concept of special operations
capable forces for the Marine Expeditionary Units is based
upon the expeditionary and amphibious nature of the Marine
Corps and merely enhances the traditional organization of the
Marines afloat. The MEU/SOC is viewed as complementing
special forces and should not be construed as a replacement
for other special operations forces. Being special operations
capable enables the Marines to tailor a MAGTF capable of
employment in either a conventional amphibious/expeditionary
roles or in the execution of a maritime special operations
missions
.
A credible expeditionary and amphibious force must
possess a maritime special operations capability to be
successful in the modern battlefield and specifically in
maneuver warfare. Advance force operations and preassault
operations, such as intelligence gathering and destruction of
antiship or antiair missile sites, are special operations in
and of themselves
.
This Special Operations Capability enhancement of the
MAGTF allows the Marines to apply their amphibious and
expeditionary expertise in an increasingly unstable world. It
adapts the unique maritime and expeditionary role of the
Marine Corps to national defense policies and highlights the
effectiveness of a forward deployed, ship-based, force-in-




While MEB-sized MAGTFs are roughly equivalent to an
Army light division with regard to armor and firepower, the
thirty day sustainment of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade
obviously makes this force have more flexibility than a light
division with three to four days sustainment. It should also
be noted that a Marine Expeditionary Brigade contains organic
aircraft. Therefore, the Marine Corps seeks to defeat a
numerically superior force through joint forces and combined-
arms utilizing both maneuver strategy and sequencing. The
unmatched staying power of the Marine Corps due to their
inherent sea-based sustainability enables the MAGTF to remain
in a crisis region to promote deterrence or conduct limited
combat missions in support of the build-up of follow-on
forces. This is a mission that is truly to the Marine Corps.
The Marines Corps force structure provides the
flexibility and capability to react to crisis response or to
conduct a forcible entry from the sea utilizing a combined
arms in an integrated, mission-specific, self-sustaining
force. No other power projection force possesses such a
diverse number of capabilities as maintained in a Marine Air-
Ground Task Force. The flexibility, combat power and
unequaled sustainability of the MAGTF combined with its many
assets affords the Marine Corps a versatility that is capable
of operating in a fluid and uncertain environment.
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B. THE CONCEPT OF MANEUVER
Maneuver warfare has become the official doctrine of the
U.S. Marine Corps which necessitates the understanding of the
basic concepts underlying this doctrine. If maneuver warfare
is equated to simple movement the practical applications of
the maneuver philosophy cannot be fully appreciated.
There exist two distinct styles of warfare: an attrition
style which is based on firepower, and a maneuver style which
is based on movement.
1. ATTRITION WARFARE
Warfare by "attrition" as identified with the "Battle
of the Atlantic" and the "Battle of Britain" is a more
scientific approach to war pitting strength against strength
to ultimately achieve victory through the cumulative
destruction of the enemy's material assets by superior
firepower and technology. The inherent need for both volume
and accuracy of fire requires centralized control. The
success of attrition warfare is dependant upon the ability to
withstand attrition of friendly forces. This translates into
numerical superiority, a asset which no longer enjoyed with
the currently instituted force reductions. Victory in
attrition warfare does not depend so much on military





Warfare by "maneuver" which was best demonstrated in
"Desert Storm" strives to attack an enemy from a position of
advantage rather than driving into "the teeth" of the
opposition. The concept of maneuver strategy is not a new to
warfare or to the U.S. Marines. As defined by Joint
Publication 1-02, Maneuver is the:
"employment of forces on the battlefield through
movement in combination with fire, or fire potential,
to achieve a position of advantage with respect to the
enemy to accomplish the mission." 25
It pits strength against selected enemy weaknesses utilizing
both speed and surprise while avoiding an opponenets
strengths. The desire for speed requires decentralized
control placing a greater demand on military judgement and
initiative to identify and exploit enemy weaknesses and
tactical opportunities. These concepts require military
forces to maintain the initiative by acting more quickly than
the enemy can react, maintaining a high tempo of operations.
The United States has long enjoyed vast numerical and
technological superiority and has traditionally, although not
always, waged war by attrition. However, the Marine Corps
concept for winning on today's modern battlefield is a
philosophy based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic
maneuver.
25 As quoted in "Understanding Maneuver as the Basis for
a Doctrine" by Capt . John F. Schmitt. Marine Corps Gazette .
August 1990. p. 91.
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Maneuver warfare is comprised of a variety of styles
and methods, limited only by the imagination and the
restrictions of the given conflict. It relies on the
intelligent use of force rather than brute strength to gain
the objective economically. It applies not only at the
tactical level but also at the operational and strategic
levels and in many dimensions, not just spatial. The
traditional understanding of maneuver has been the maneuver in
space to gain a positional advantage. To maximize the
usefulness of maneuver, however, planners must consider
maneuver not only as spatial, but in time as well. It is
through maneuver in both dimensions that an numerically
inferior force can achieve decisive superiority at the
necessary time and place.
Maneuver warfare can not be defined in a single act or
even as a doctrine. It is manifest as a philosophy, a state
of mind, and a mental approach to a conflict. Maneuver
warfare avoids rules and patterns and exploits enemy
vulnerabilities through the use of rapid, violent, and
unexpected actions. It seeks the advantage through the
application of superior combat power against an enemy's
weakness. As stated in FMFM-1:
"Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks
to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid,
violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent
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and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot
cope. n26
The future amphibious operation will likely encounter
an enemy who possesses a superior armored and mechanized
capability. The modern Amphibious Task Force will have to
employ superior combined arms and maneuver skills in order to
overcome this threat.
C. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
Marine Corps MEB- and MEU-sized amphibious forces in the
forward presence and crisis response role can be crucial in
limited operations such as ensuring the control and continued
safe use of the high seas and contiguous land areas during
crisis response. The seizure of key terrain can facilitate
the control of critical choke points by denying the enemy the
freedom to reinforce or deploy forces or to threaten friendly
flanks. Amphibious forces can also contribute to joint
operations through joint force sequencing in response to
national needs.
The forward peacetime presence of amphibious forces with
their deployed Marine Expeditionary Units/Special Operations
Capable in the Mediterranean and Pacific/Indian oceans serves
as a visible and credible indicator of American capability to
react to sudden, unforeseen crises involving U.S. interests.
26 FMFM 1 Warfiqhtinq . Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 6 March 1989.
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These units possess a combined ground/air combat capability
which can provide a readily available military presence, to
deter or respond to a crisis before it has a chance to spread.
The deterrence effect of a MEB-sized amphibious force off the
coast of politically unstable country can not be overlooked.
Another essential element of contingency response and
forward presence that must be considered is forcible entry.
The U.S. must have the capability to insert forces into an
area regardless of local attitude or opposition if we are to
maintain a credible conventional deterrent.
Political constraints and the inability to achieve either
local naval and air superiority over an extended period can
preclude a prolonged engagement on foreign soil. This
requires a force capable of a swift armed incursion or forced
entry and equally capable of a rapid retraction of forces if
necessary.
In such an environment, the amphibious forces can provide
a discriminating use of force that can have a disproportionate
value compared to its relatively small size. During "Desert
Storm" the U.S. Marine Corps deployed an amphibious task force
of nearly 18,000 Marines, the largest amphibious force
deployment since the Korean War, to which the Iraqis dedicated
eleven divisions, totaling some 80,000 troops in preparation
for an amphibious assault that was to never come. The Iraqis
were also forced to garrison troops on Bubiyan and Faylaka
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Islands, both of which commanded key sea approaches to vital
areas
.
The various feints and raids conducted by the amphibious
forces allowed U.S. ground forces to conduct an end-run of
Iraqis forces while the Iraqis prepared for the inevitable
assault from the sea. This is the essence of amphibious and
maneuver warfare.
Amphibious forces can freely move, land, and support
themselves logistically virtually anywhere in the world's
littoral without benefit of harbors, ports, or facilities and
can also be stationed over-the-horizon at sea requiring no
basing or overflight clearances. Should the landing area be
hostile, MEB-sized amphibious forces can overcome the
opposition and force their way ashore.
Since all of the assets necessary to conduct a forcible
entry are organic to most MAGTFs, the planning and execution
of forced entry operations can be accomplished in a relatively
short time. It is this forcible entry capability that offers
a diversity of employment options to planners in crises
response.
The importance of an amphibious forcible entry capability
and its role in national strategy cannot be overemphasized as
described by Liddell Hart:
"The history of warfare shows that the basic strategic
asset of sea-based peoples is amphibious flexibility.
In tackling land-based opponents, they can produce a
distraction to the enemy's power of concentration that
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is advantageously disproportionate to the scale of
force they employ and the resources they possess." 27
This does not, however apply to all levels of warfare. A
forcible entry at the strategic level (a major war such as
World War II) would require the addition of allied forces. A
forcible entry at the operational level (campaign sized
similar to Operation Desert Storm) assumes host nation support
as outlined in the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment .
Finally, at the tactical level (similar to the invasion of
Grenada or Panama) , a forcible entry capability is necessary
not only for crisis response, but as a deterrent in a forward
presence capable force.
Amphibious operations provide one of only two means of
forcible entry currently maintained by the U.S. force
structure with airborne operations being the only other forced
entry capability. The amphibious operation has consistently
proven its viability not only in WW II and Korea, but also in
Vietnam when it was used on some 60 occasions to provide
flanking and blocking maneuvers, again in the lesser sea-
launched efforts to evacuate Saigon and Phnom Penh, and in the
Falklands War. 28
An additional asset of the Marine Corps is the capability
to conduct amphibious special operations. Amphibious raids
27 Hart, B.H. Liddell, "Marines and Strategy" in Marine
Corps Gazette . May 1990, pp. 18-25.
28 Evans, M. H. H., Amphibious Operations: The Projection
of Sea Power Ashore.
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and other special naval missions such as reconnaissance,
intelligence gathering, diversions have always been a part of
Marine Corps strategy. Raids can force an enemy to disperse
his forces, divert his attention, or deny use of vital
facilities, equipment, or an area. The ability of Marine
forces to conduct amphibious special operations is crucial in
an increasingly unstable world where deterrence can be
accomplished through auspicious intelligence and rapid
response.
Amphibious operations should maintain an integral part of
any maritime strategy especially with it's ability of
exploiting sea control. Amphibious assaults can have a
significant influence in strategy by virtue of their
diversionary capability and can play a large role as a
contingency force in the new national security strategy. The
flexibility of amphibious warfare can be demonstrated through
the ability of maritime forces to marry with land forces
through the concept of sequencing, pre-positioning, or airlift
capabilities can provide a continuous buildup of forces in
theater in times of conflict.
Maneuver strategy affords amphibious forces an enhanced
ability to respond to crises and conflicts while facing
technological advances in weaponry and asymetrical forces.
The use of maneuver to overcome superior numbers and smart
weapons can be achieved through tactical surprise, dispersed
landings, and rapid response.
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The modern battlefield commander can no longer depend on
strength alone to achieve victory. The current force
reductions in the U.S. military will render attrition warfare
an all but obsolete concept, thereby propelling maneuver
warfare to the forefront of modern strategy. Amphibious
operations with their inherent flexibility and mobility, when
combined with maneuver strategy, provides the U.S. with a
capability to respond to crises and conflicts throughout the
world with reduced forces without significant degradation of
it's warfighting capability.
Operational speed, tactical mobility, and the firepower of
Marine combined arms would enable landing forces to attack
along multiple axes, by air and surface while creating
confusion, disrupting the enemy's planning, compounding his
targeting problem, and denying him the opportunity to attack
concentrated and relatively immobile forces.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The Marine Corps has all of the characteristics of an
crisis response force, particularly in terms of balance and
flexiblity, strategic mobility, and it's sustainability and
controllability. They maintain the unique capability to
provide a balanced force of combined arms in a variety of
crisis situations.
In a future where U.S. military power on the Eurasian
continent is in recession and access to overseas bases and
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support for forward-based forces is decreasing, the focus of
the new national security strategy is on deterrence, forward
presence, crisis response and reconstitution. The Marine
Corps, with is capable, mobile, and logistically independent
naval forces is organized with sufficient flexibility to
enable them to provide the U.S. with a forward presence while
maintaining the ability to respond to crises. If the need
arises the U.S. Marine Corps, through their capabilities for
forced entry operations and joint force sequencing can provide




III. SOVIET ANTILANDING DEFENSE
The new national security strategy has focused the Armed
Forces on peacetime presence and contingency-type operations.
While conventional war planners should be changing their focus
from the "big" war to the regional contingencies, they must
not lose sight of the possibility of conflicts against Soviet-
trained enemies and the remote possiblitity of contingency
operations against the USSR in a regional/local war. We must
also examine Soviet doctrine in the unlikely event of the
reconstitution of Soviet forces resulting in a big war with
the Soviet Union, or whatever replaces it. It is for these
reasons, however remote they might seem, that necessitates the
examination of Soviet military doctrine.
Furthermore, the end of the cold war, and more recently
the failed coup in Russia, has signaled a new era in not only
United States military policy, but Soviet military policy as
well. The political and economic implications of this new
Soviet era is shifting the impetus of the Soviet military away
from an offensive military strategy and towards a border,
including maritime, defense military.
The Soviet military perceives that the military leadership
of the United States and its allies in the NATO alliance has
attached a special significance in joint actions by different
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branches of the armed forces and supporting troops from sea
axes. 29 They believe that the construction and modernization
of amphibious naval forces and capabilities has taken on
greater scope in U.S. and allied planning.
"Because of this perceived threat of coastal
assault, the USSR Armed Forces continue to improve
their ability and readiness to rebuff a sudden attack
by the aggressor, including an attack from a sea axis,
and to deliver crushing retaliatory blows with ground
troops and naval forces working in close
cooperation. " 30
Antilanding defense has been taken seriously since World
War II and has taken a more important role in Soviet doctrine
since the mid-1980's. The determination of whether the Soviet
military still maintains an emphasis on antilanding defenses
requires the examination of Soviet forces, literature, and
exercises to determine the intentions to employ their military
forces in this particular manner. This chapter will examine
the Soviet capability to defend against an amphibious assault
through the analysis of the their defensive doctrine, the
various branches of the Soviet military, and the coastal
defense exercises conducted by Soviet forces to determine not
only capabilities, but possible intentions.
29 Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin. "Prepare Yourself
for Modern Warfare" in Morskoy Sbornik . 1/89. pp. 3-8.
Admiral K. Makarov. "Cooperation in Operations in
Coastal Axes" in Morskoy Sbornik . 12/86. p. 23.
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A. DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE
Both old and new Soviet military doctrine is replete with
strategy on "defense of the homeland" which has always been
considered the most important aspect of their military
doctrine. Even if the USSR breaks up, whatever replaces it
will still have a military and that military will be required
to defend its homeland.
Defense is defined in the Soviet Military Dictionary as:
"a form of combat actions used to repulse an offensive by
superior enemy forces, to screen certain axes, to
economize on forces and resources on secondary axes, and
to create a superiority over the enemy on the main axes.
The essence of the defense consists of defeating enemy
groupings as they advance and occupy an attack position,
during an attack of the forward edge of defense, and in
the course of combat actions to hold defensive lines." 31
These definitions provide the general concept of defense as
viewed by Soviet strategists.
The pre-coup, but "new" Soviet defensive doctrine calls
for a "layered defense" posture requiring the enemy to advance
through various stages of Soviet forces with increasing
resistance as enemy forces approach Soviet territory.
The "combined arms" aspect of Soviet military doctrine,
which parallels layered defense, is another theme that is
extensively cited in Soviet defensive doctrine. The Soviets
stress the use of "combined arms" or various arms of the
military in association with each other. This affords a
31 K.L. Kushch-Zharko. Soviet Military Dictionary . Vol.5,
1983. pp. 660-665.
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mutual support concept which enables the Soviets to employ the
most effective and capable forces in a coordinated effort at
a specific time and location.
The examination of "defense of the homeland" while
providing for defense against enemy landings on Soviet soil is
more concerned with the defense of the maritime coastline of
the Soviet Ground Forces. This places a large responsibility
on all branches of the Soviet military to be flexible,




The Soviet Military Dictionary defines antilanding defense
as
:
"defense of a coastal zone by ground forces in
coordination with naval forces and aviation to prevent
the landing of enemy amphibious and airborne
parties . " 32
Soviets are greatly concerned, in theory, about the threat
to not only the front, but to theater forces as well, by a
well-timed amphibious operation. While the Soviet Union
downplays the likelihood of a major strategic-level amphibious
assault on the coastline of the Soviet Union, they do
differentiate and take seriously smaller tactical-level raids
and the defense of the maritime flank of a supporting
offensive or defensive operation which may be beyond or within
32 Ibid.
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Soviet borders. The predominance of antiamphibious military
and combat training/exercises deal with defense of the
maritime flanks of operations.
Soviet antilanding defense is a multifaceted effort with
success dependent on the coordination of forces and material
which can be an extremely complex and painstaking matter for
Soviet planners. According to the scale of antilanding
defense, coordination of participating forces and means can be
either at the operational or tactical levels.
The tactical organization is coordinated by the commander
in charge of the coastal defenses among the forces available
in the defensive area such as coastal artillery, naval air
forces, and the coastal naval forces.
Operational coordination is organized among rocket
weapons, formations of ground and air forces, and the navy, to
serve the interest of these forces which can inflict the
greatest losses on the landing forces at a particular time and
place.
The General Staff would most likely subordinate amphibious
defense to a coastal front or fleet depending on the perceived
threat. The principal organizer of coordination would be the
commander of the antilanding defense. He would assign tasks
to combined-operating formations and units and determine the
sequence and means of carrying them out, order the commitment
of the troops, air forces, and naval vessels, the type of
support, and other matters. The forces of the different
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branches of the armed forces receive combat missions in
accordance with combat capabilities, the expected
compositition of the enemy landing party, and the conditions
in which the fighting against them is expected to occur.
Responsibility of defense is divided geographically between
front and fleet commanders with the boundary of ground
operations extending approximately 150nm from the shore.
The first "layer" of the Soviet antilanding defense could
be the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) which maintain the
capability of striking the Amphibious Task Force in homeports,
in transit, or in the Amphibious Operating Area with long-
range (greater than 1000 km) nuclear missiles.
The Soviet military preserves the concept that an active
offense at the tactical level is permissible under an overall
defensive posture. Utilizing this concept the Soviet Air
Force could also provide defensive strikes on the amphibious
task forces with their long-range bombers. Bombers of the
Soviet Air Force are capable of launching missile attacks on
U.S. ports or on task forces in transit. Frontal aviation of
the Soviet Air Force are tasked at the operational and
tactical levels of war with achieving air superiority and
providing air defense over the defensive area. Naval
forces would be used to provide reconnaissance of enemy
landing forces, destroy enemy naval forces at bases and at
sea, deliver strikes against amphibious landing parties in
homeport, during the sea crossing and in the landing region,
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lay minefields on the approaches to sectors of coastline
suitable for amphibious landings, help ground forces destroy
landing parties already on shore through fire support,
blockade coastal sectors seized by the enemy, and prevent
evacuation of enemy troops. This indicates that opposition
forces can conceivably expect Soviet defensive strikes by
naval forces in homeports, during the task force transit, and
as they approach Soviet territory with the level of resistance
intensifying as the task force nears Soviet coastal waters.
In addition to naval forces, the Maritime Border Troops of
the KGB are responsible for protecting the nation's maritime
borders against penetration by paramilitary forces. These KGB
maritime border troops have an army-style organization of
approximately 12,000 personnel operating about 200 combat
ships, patrol craft, and armed auxiliaries and a large number
of light fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.
The Soviets maintain the troops of air defense (PVO) who
provide defense against attack from aircraft, missiles and
satellites. They maintain aviation assets to intercept
incoming hostile aircraft as far away as possible, rocket
troops utilizing surface to air missiles for protection of air
defense, and radar and communication systems to provide
guidance and control of aircraft and missiles of the troops of
the air defense.
Finally, ground forces are assigned to combat enemy
nuclear weapons and aviation, destroy landing parties during
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the landing, and hold occupied segments of coastline and
islands. Coastal defense forces have been organized in each
fleet.
This means that the first strike against the landing force
even on distant approaches can be delivered by submarines,
rocket-carrying aircraft, rocket weapons, bombers and fighter-
bombers; and by artillery, tanks, and infantry weapons on near
approaches. The Soviets also stress the need to maintain
freedom of maneuverability and the capability to more
effectively employ basic manpower and material in one or
another area when delivering strikes.
The decisive strike is made where the most successful
results can be achieved, where employment of the required
number and composition of forces is possible, and at a time
when enemy capabilities are considerably limited. Both
operations and battles are organized according to definite
boundaries, and each formation or unit is assigned tasks with
the time of their execution. Signals, boundaries and the
order of strikes by each unit are determined for the purpose
of achieving a simultaneous general attack.
As the landing force approaches the area of debarkation,
the intensity of fire on the assault forces will continually
increase as it becomes possible to strike the landing troops
with rocket weapons, and, in a correspondingly small radius of




The application of some of these arms and services to an
antiamphibious operation remains relatively similar to that of
other defensive situations except for a significant departure
from standard defensive operations in that defense against
amphibious landing is a static defense while retaining the
ability to launch a follow-on counterattack.
The experience of the World War II showed the Soviet
strategists that the success of the defense depended on the
concerted action of infantry, tanks and naval ships, as well
as of aircraft prompting the combined arms aspect of defensive
missions. Naval ships normally conduct reconnaissance and
keep an eye on enemy movements by sea, deny the enemy the
possibility to conduct reconnaissance, destroy enemy sea
transports and amphibious landing craft with troops, attack
his ships and lay mine fields along probable routes of the
enemy. The air force flies reconnaissance missions in behalf
of the ground troops, lays mines, destroys enemy airborne
landing units, fighting ships, transport vessels and landing
craft on the approaches to the shore and affords cover to the
friendly forces in defense.
The overall task of the combined arms units in coastal
defense is the destruction of enemy landing troops and
equipment while they are reloaded from the transports to the
landing craft, during the approach to the shore and during the
actual landing or, in the event of a successful enemy landing,
they are tasked with the destruction of enemy forces ashore.
54
C. SOVIET MILITARY ART
Soviet military art is a philosophy that must be
understood to better grasp the Soviet concept of defensive
operations. The Soviets identify three basic levels of Soviet
military art: tactics, operational art, and strategic.
As defined in Christopher Donnelly's RED BANNER :
"Tactics is military activity at divisional level and
below, either of combined arms or special-to-arm,
including, in the Soviet definition, tactics
specifically applicable to MVD and KGB troops." 33
The tactical level of conflict can therefore be classified as
a battle (boy) involving a division or below level of command
in a tactical direction.
Operational art is divided into three categories:
operational-strategic; operational art; and operational-
tactical and is defined by Donnelly as:
"...the theory and practice of preparing for, and
conducting, combined arms (or fleet) combined or
independent operations." 34
At the operational art level of conflict, the operational
engagement would be conducted by a front, Army, or Corps in an
operational direction.
Strategy, the highest branch of military art, is defined
as:
"the theory and practice of preparing a country and
its armed forces for war; the planning a conducting of
33 Christopher Donnelly. Red Banner . Jane's Information
Group LTD. 1986. pp. 218-220.
34 Ibid
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strategic operations and of wars as a whole; and the
study of war-fighting." 35
The strategic level of conflict would be the campaign,
strategic battle (bitva) , or strategic operation involving a
"group of fronts" level of command in a theater of strategic
military activity (TVD)
.
It must be noted that these terms of scale can also be
applied to the mission rather than to the force deployed to
execute the mission.
D. NAVAL FORCES
The bulk of recent literature on the Soviet Navy has
focused on the Soviet Navy's "blue water" capabilities, or
lack thereof, with little attention being given to their
coastal defense capabilities which could conceivably play a
significant role in Soviet defensive operations.
This section, while not attempting to underrate the
Soviets open-ocean capability, will focus on the role the
Soviet Navy with its various branches (Soviet Naval Infantry,
coastal artillery and rockets, surface forces, subsurface
forces, and aviation) would play in support of coastal defense
and "defense of the homeland."
1. NAVAL OPERATIONAL ART
The preponderance of Soviet military doctrine pertains
to the effectiveness of the ground forces and places the
35 Ibid.
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Soviet Navy in a position of supporting these ground forces.
Soviet naval operational art establishes the broad missions of
protection of maritime axes, straits, and chokepoints, the
interdiction of sea lines of communication, strategic defense,
and strategic offense. While the Soviet Navy maintains the
capabilities for these missions, the new apparent intentions
of the Soviet Navy is one of "Defense of the Homeland" with
the bulk of their fleet remaining in coastal waters.
The Soviet Union devotes much of their naval strength
to the protection of their coasts and to preventing any
penetration of what they call the pre-coastal zone. Only
China deploys more, submarines, fast patrol vessels and
aircraft in this role. A navy that maintains large numbers of
vessels of this type can be assumed to attach considerable
importance to coastal defense. 36
It is a well documented fact that all forces,
including the naval forces of the four Soviet fleets must be
prepared to defend the borders of the Soviet Union.
"Naval forces are used to carry on reconnaissance of
enemy landing forces, destroy enemy naval forces at
bases and at sea, deliver strikes against amphibious
landing parties during the sea crossing and in the
landing region, lay minefields on the approaches to
sectors of coastline suitable for amphibious landings,
help ground forces destroy landing parties already on
shore, blackade coastal sectors seized by the enemy,
and prevent evacuation of enemy troops." 37
36 James Cable. "Coastal Defense: Britain's Achilles
Heel?" in NAVY international , pp. 40-43. January 1984.
37 Soviet Military Dictionary . Vol. 5, 1983. pp. 660-665.
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This translates in Soviet naval operational art to
coastal defense and support of the ground forces through the
protection of the army's seaward flanks from attack by enemy
naval and amphibious forces, and providing naval gunfire and
logistics support of land operations. Soviet strategists
further state:
"...the success of continental operations will
apparently be affected not only by the naval forces
supporting the army, but also by naval forces
participating in the destruction of enemy combatants
and vessels in independent operations at sea for the
purpose of winning supremacy in a sea (or oceanic)
theater of military operations or by naval units which
create favorable conditions for actions of the fleet
and to a significant extent support the success of the
ground forces and other land-based forces cooperation
with them. " 38
Statements by Soviet strategists and military elite
concerning the importance of coastal defense and support of
the ground forces gave impetus to Soviet naval expansion with
a focus on the development of surface and subsurface forces
that could effectively counter threats in coastal regions.
"The Soviet Navy's assiduous development of small
missile-firing warships like the Osa, Komar and,
later, the Nanuchka and its continuing maintenance of
large offshore defense forces shows that defending the
Motherland against maritime attack remains a high
priority. " 39
Defense against amphibious assaults remains an
important objective in Soviet operation art in conjunction
38 B. Makayev, "Joint Operations of the Navy and Ground
Forces, " Morskov sbornik 4 (1984) : 21-6 .
39 Ibid., 173.
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with concurrent movements of strategies such as "bastion
defense" . The Soviet Navy has implemented an infrastructure
of naval forces that is well suited to defeat enemy landings,
attack hostile amphibious forces during ocean crossings, or
help repel amphibious support operations in the defense of
coastal regions and the support of ground forces along the
maritime axes of the Soviet Union.
2. SUBSURFACE FORCES
While most attention on Soviet submarines has focused
on ballistic missile submarines, the Soviets maintain a very
large inventory (216) of both nuclear and diesel-electric
powered cruise missile and torpedo-attack submarines. 40
Submarine ballistic missiles must be viewed as a
potential weapon that could be used against the amphibious
task force. The use of SLBM's against ports, amphibious
groups in transit, and in the Amphibious Operations Area is an
option that cannot be ruled out.
The large number of diesel-electric powered torpedo-
attack and cruise missile submarines (110) would suggest that
the interdiction of amphibious forces in the theater/coastal
region would be a likely mission for the limited operational
range of this class of submarines. 41 The nuclear cruise
40 Captain Richard Sharpe RN. editor. Jane's Fighting
Ships 1991-92
. Ninety-fourth Edition. Sentinel House, UK.
Jane's Information Group, p. 582.
41 Ibid.
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missile and torpedo-attack submarines would provide the Soviet
Navy with the ability to interdict the amphibious forces in
U.S. ports, during transit, such as Marine forces "swinging"
from the Pacific to the Atlantic or enroute to Southwest Asia,
in staging areas, or outside of the coastal/theater region.
Cruise missile and torpedo attack submarines are the
primary general-purpose weapons of the Soviet Navy. They
account for over 40 percent of all major Soviet combatants,
and their offensive capabilities make them the greatest
potential threat to Western battle groups, submarines, and sea
lanes
.
Soviet doctrine does not specifically address the role
of the submarine in coastal defense other than the Navy will
support the ground forces with whatever means available. The
large number of diesel-electric submarines would suggest that
these forces could be kept in coastal regions to support the
ground forces either directly through cruise missile strikes
in theater or indirectly through interdiction of amphibious
forces. The ability of Soviet submarines to lay mines in
maritime chokepoints and possible amphibious operating areas
is well established and must be taken as a serious threat to
the Amphibious Task Force.
3. NAVAL AVIATION
Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) , which has historically
performed an insignificant part in Soviet Navy hierarchy, has
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recently undergone a significant modernization program. 42
While still remaining subordinate to the Navy, SNA has risen
to the forefront of Soviet naval operational art through the
increased capabilities, speed, and flexiblity they can provide
to the fleet and ground forces.
The majority of SNA aircraft are land-based with
regiments assigned to each of the four fleets. Sea-based
aircraft of the SNA are expanding with the acquisition of the
Soviet aircraft carrier, yet still remain in their infancy
period.
SNA is composed of over 1900 front line and training
aircraft with over 90,000 officers and men. 43 They maintain
in excess of 350 strike/bombers (Badger, Backfire, and
Blinder) and 170 fighter/fighter-bombers (Forger and
Fitter)
,
44 The Soviets deploy 100 strike/bombers and
fighter/fighter-bomber aircraft to the Northern Sea; 100 to
the Baltic Sea; 150 to the Black Sea; and 170 to the Pacific
Ocean. 45
Soviet Naval Aviation has developed an impressive
force of sea- and land-based aircraft and helicopters with the
42 In 1990 and 1991 the Soviet Air Force transferred
approximately 500 aircraft including Frogfoots, Floggers, and
Fencers to naval air bases as part of the SNA modernization
program. Jane's Fighting Ships 1991-1992 .




ability to project Soviet power over broad oceanic expanses.
The strike/bombers of SNA with combat radii exceeding 3,500
miles provide the means to strike the Amphibious Task Force at
points in the Norwegian Sea or off the coast of Africa. The
fighter/fighter-bombers with combat radii exceeding 200 miles
provide the ability to provide air superiority and close air
support for defensive forces.
Soviet Naval Aviation is tasked with five basic
missions: reconnaissance and surveillance, anti-ship strike,
anti-submarine, support, and more recently close air support.
SNA provides one of the many layers of defense associated with
Soviet defensive doctrine. They can provide an extended arm
to intercept enemy forces as they enter coastal regions or
provide close air support to offensive amphibious landings
conducted by SNI in support of ground forces. The addition of
Soviet aircraft carriers will enhance not only the capability
of the SNA but extend the range of coastal defense.
The importance that the Soviet Navy has placed on
naval aviation can be witnessed through the recent additions
of modern aircraft to their forces providing substantial
increases in SNA capabilities and range. The success of
Soviet coastal defense operations will depend directly on SNA
air support capabilities, and with the current modernization
programs and the addition of aircraft carriers, Soviet Naval




The Soviet Navy maintains not only a large open ocean
capable fleet, but maintains an exceptionally large coastal
water fleet. The Soviet open-ocean fleet consists of aircraft
carriers (5) , cruisers (38) , destroyers (29) , and frigates
(146) . 46 The coastal forces of patrol combatants/craft
include corvettes (76), missile craft (82), torpedo craft
(32), patrol craft (192), and amphibious ships/crafts (78). 47
In addition, the Soviets maintain an internal waters fleet
consisting of approximately 150 small craft. 48
The Soviet Navy has amassed a number of "large
combatants" which can effectively extend the borders of Soviet
territory through their increased range capability. The
ability to intercept enemy forces at extended ranges or during
transit provides an "extended coastal defense" by striking the
enemy forces prior to their reaching the effective maximum
range of their weapons or their amphibious operations area.
This implies that the Amphibious Task Force could encounter
Soviet surface resistance as far south as the Cape of Good
Hope. Soviet surface forces therefore can support the layered
defense that Soviet defensive doctrine emphasizes.
46 The Military Balance 1991-1992 . Published by Brassey's





The large number of small combatants (missile,
torpedo, patrol, and mine craft) that the Soviet Navy-
possesses would also play a major role in the layered defense
of the Soviet homeland.
The mission of the Soviet Navy's small combatant
forces is to provide reconnassance, coastal security and to
defend the maritime approaches to the Soviet Union. While
their operations are limited to coastal areas due to their
endurance and difficulties in heavy seas, the most important
characteristic of the Soviet small combatants is the
employment of highly lethal weapons on inexpensive, expendable
platforms. Although production and manning require only a
modest investment of naval resources, many of these Soviet
boats are capable of destroying much larger and more valuable
enemy warships and merchant vessels as demonstrated by the
sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat in 1967 by an Egyptian-
owned Osa missile patrol boat. 49 The Soviet small combatants
are also capable of high speed maneuverability allowing them
to attack and then retreat before defensive measures can be
taken by enemy forces. The small size of these combatants
also tends to make them harder to detect, particularly in
coastal areas. 50 This was a lesson learned in World War II
49 Bruce W. Watson and Susan M. Watson editors. The




where small combat units worked well with aviation in a "hit
and run" type role.
The Soviet Union has the longest coastline in the
world, extending over 76,000 nautical miles or over twice that
of the United States. To assist coastal forces in the defense
of these vast coastal regions, the Soviet Navy maintains the
largest mine warfare force in the world. They utilize over
135 ocean and coastal minewsweepers combined with
approximately 260 minesweeping boats to make up their active
force. 51 When combined with the largest inventory of mines
in the world these mine warfare ships can produce an effective
obstacle to enemy forces in coastal regions, ports, or
straits. The mine warfare force can also be used for
additional tasks such as patrol and picket duties.
The Soviet Union maintains an impressive open-ocean
navy, but the small combatants of the coastal defense forces
present a formidable challenge to forces approaching the
maritime flanks of the Soviet Union. The coastal defense
forces of the Soviet surface navy provide numerous challenges
to foreign navies and in light of their capabilities must be
viewed as an integral and formidable branch of Soviet coastal
defense.
51 Jane's Fighting Ships 1991-1992 . p. 582
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5. SOVIET NAVAL INFANTRY
The Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI) is an elite combat
force reformed in the 1960 's to provide the Soviet Navy with
the ability to conduct combat operations on maritime axes in
the interests of the Navy as well as coastal elements of the
ground forces
.
The SNI has undergone a modernization program in
recent years with an increase in amphibious lift capability
such as the Ivan Rogov LPDs and air cushion vehicles. SNI is
defined in Soviet literature as a light infantry, highly
mechanized and highly capable force. They deploy two brigades
with the Northern Fleet, one brigade with the Baltic Fleet,
one brigade with the Black Sea Fleet, and a division with two
regiments and supporting units with the Pacific Fleet. 52
The missions of the Soviet Naval Infantry are the
defense of bases and other entities against air and amphibious
assaults and participation with ground forces units in
antilanding defense. They may also conduct amphibious assault
landings in cooperation with ground forces on a limited and
usually tactical basis. 53
It must be noted that SNI does not possess any organic
air support and therefore are not designed to conduct
extensive independent operations. The range of the SNI is
52 The Military Balance : 1991-1992 . p. 36
53 Major General I. Skuratov. "The Naval Infantry: Past
and Present" in Morskly Sbornik No. 10, 1989, pp. 18-21.
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currently limited to the range of land based aircraft
necessary for their support.
Recent efforts by the Soviet Naval Infantry have been
on the development of the capability for local amphibious
operations in close support of the ground forces and the
control of fleet exits from the Baltic and Black Seas and
various other chokepoints.
Amphibious landings under SNI doctrine would be
conducted to provide a quick rate of advance by forces in
coastal areas, to launch attacks against the enemy's flanks
and rear, to secure operational bases for Soviet forces, and
to establish a more favorable tactical correlation of
forces. 54 Amphibious landings are viewed as a possible
method of shifting combat operations to enemy territory to
promote the defeat of the enemy and to seize and hold enemy
coastal areas until the arrival of the main body of Soviet
forces. 55 Amphibious landings are also viewed as a means of
counterattack should U.S. or enemy amphibious forces secure a
foothold on Soviet territory. The importance of air support
is emphasized in amphibious operations as being crucial to the
survival of the assault forces.
The Soviet Naval Infantry is obviously not the U.S.




world among marine-type forces based on their manpower
strength alone. 56 They do not have the capability to launch
even an operational amphibious assault complete with organic
air support as identified with the U.S. Marines. What the
Soviet Naval Infantry does have is the manpower, armament, and
capabilities to successfully execute missions in the interests
of the various fleets and ground forces along the maritime
axes. The SNI also maintains a viable amphibious assault
capability compatable with tactical assaults and raids in
support of ground forces along coastal regions
.
The Soviet Naval Infantry was established to provide
support to the fleet and ground forces through the defense of
coastal regions. The capabilities of these forces are more
than adequate for this purpose and, with the improvement and
modernization of organic equipment and support activities, the
Soviet Naval Infantry will continue to play a significant role
in Soviet defensive doctrine and specifically the Soviet
Union's coastal defense strategy.
6. COASTAL ARTILLERY AND MISSILE FORCES
The coastal artillery and missile branch of the Soviet
navy has remained relatively obscure to Western analysts.
Despite the lack of prestige that this branch of the Soviet
Tritten, James John. "Soviet Amphibious, Mine, and
Coastal-Patrol Forces" in The Soviet and Other Communist
Navies: The View from the Mid-1980s , edited by James L.
George. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. 1986. p.
158.
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Navy carries, the missiles and artillery of these troops would
present a formidable force to the U.S. Amphibious Task Force
in the amphibious operating area.
The coastal artillery and missiles branch of the
Soviet Navy is a defensive only capable force consisting of
over 14,000 troops divided among the four fleets and utilizing
various artillery pieces and anti-ship missiles. 57 Anti-
aircraft guns and missile units are also organic to every
coastal missile and artillery battalion.
The coastal artillery and missile forces consist of
three missile battalions in the Northern Sea; six battalions
in the Baltic Sea; five battalions in the Black Sea; and five
battalions in the Pacific Ocean fleet. 58 There are usually
fifteen to eighteen missiles in each battalion utilizing an
eight-wheeled Transport/Elevate/Launch (TEL) vehicle. These
forces are not utilized to defend an entire coast, but to
defend major ports or approaches to naval bases. The number
of coastal artillery and missile battalions would indicate
that these forces could conceivably defend at the most, two
ports or bases in each of the four fleet areas.
The Soviet coastal artillery and missile forces are
not a high profile organization but have been assigned the
important role of protecting approaches to naval bases and
Steven J. Zaloga, "Soviet Coastal Defense Missiles
in Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review . April 1989. pp. 167-172
58 The Military Balance 1991-1992 . pp. 36-45.
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major ports within the Soviet Union. Modernization of coastal
defense missiles and artillery has been an ongoing process in
the last decade. The Soviets are replacing outdated equipment
with modern mobile equipment with capabilities far improved
over previous versions. The modernization of the coastal
artillery and missile forces with mobile artillery and
missiles, when combined with existing fixed coastal defense
sites will provide the Soviets with a much more flexible and
viable defense force against enemies approaching the maritime
flanks of the Soviet Union.
As Admiral Grishanov stated:
"The Soviet Navy's missile and artillery forces are
equipped with up-to-date guided missiles, fully-
automated fire control and guidance systems, long
range artillery, sophisticated radar systems, etc.
Their firepower, operational range and accuracry of
fire ensure a reliable protection for the country's
coastline and major military and industrial
installations situated in coastal areas from an enemy
seaborne attack as well as a reliable destruction of
enemy forces well out to sea." 59
7 . COASTAL DEFENSE TROOPS 60
The Coastal Defense Troops are a newly formed branch
of the Soviet military composed of 20,000 troops divided into
four motorized rifle divisions, one artillery brigade, and two
artillery regiments. They possess 810 T-80 main battle tanks
59 Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till. The Sea in Soviet
Strategy . Annaplois, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. 1989. p.
180.
60 The Military Balance 1991-1992 . pp. 36-45.
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and 830 artillery pieces including both towed and self-
propelled. The Coastal Defense Troops currently deploy one
motorized rifle division and one artillery regiment to the
Northern Fleet; one motorized rifle division and one artillery
regiment to the Baltic Fleet; one motorized rifle division and
one artillery brigade to the Black Sea Fleet, and one
motorized rifle division to the Pacific fleet. It is
important to note that the newly formed coastal defense troops
employ the same main battle tank (T-80) as the Soviet ground
forces while the Soviet Naval Infantry employs the older main
battle tank (T-54) . The number of troops and the modern
equipment maintained by the recently established Coastal
Defense Troops would suggest that they possess the potential
for not only a defensive operations, but an offensive
operations as well.
8. KGB TROOPS AND FLEET
The KGB maintains a force of Maritime Border Troops
that are responsible for the protection of the nation's
maritime borders. There are approximately 12,000 personnel
assigned to the Maritime Border Troops and they maintain about
200 combat ships, patrol craft, and armed auxilaries in
addition to about a dozen supply ships. 61 It must be
acknowledged that riverine craft and flotillas are included in
61 Norman Polmar. Guide to the Soviet Navy . Annapolis,
Maryland: Naval Institute Press. 1986. p. 64-73.
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the accounting of maritime forces of the KGB Maritime Border
Troops . 62
The KGB ships are similar to those of the Soviet Navy
except they possess reduced anti-air and anti-submarine
capabilities in favor of heavier gun armaments. These ships
have a significant combat capability and in wartime could
certainly be used to supplement naval forces in combat
operations much like the U.S. Coast Guard operates under Navy
control in wartime. The KGB also operates a large number of
light fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters which could be used
for reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting of amphibious
forces off the coast of the Soviet Union.
E. TACTICAL AND TACTICAL-OPERATIONAL MISSILES 63
The tactical and tactical-operational missiles of the
ground forces (FROG, SCUD, and SCARAB) provide yet another
layer of antilanding defense. Soviet doctrine states that
tactical and tactical operational missiles provide the basic
firepower of the front against amphibious forces. The Soviets
have carefully researched and developed tactics for the use of
tactical and tactical-operational missiles against the ATF
62
"Soviet Amphibious, Mine, and Coastal-Patrol Forces"
p. 166.
63 Information collected for this section was compiled
from various sources including: Soviet Antiamphibious Landing
Defense , Morskoy Sbornik , Soviet Naval Digest , and Soviet
Military Review .
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threatening the flank of front offensive operations along a
coastal axis.
In antilanding defense, tactical missiles are utilized
primarlily against AAV's and landing craft during both
movement to the beach, and in the case of AAV's, subsequent
operations ashore. They may also be used against heliborne
elements of the landing force in helicopter landing zones.
Tactical missiles are employed as the first line of defense
close ashore at maximum range in coordination with barriers
and mines
.
Tactical-operational missiles can be used to deliver
nuclear and chemical attacks against both transports and
escorts ships in the AOA, as well as against landing forces
during consolidation ashore. They are controlled by the front
commander, are extremely flexible and can present a formidable
challenge to the ATF.
F. GROUND FORCES
The Ground Forces provide the final layer in the defense
of the Soviet Union or a maritime flank. The Soviet
organization of the defense of a coast and certain tactical
methods of operating to rebuff amphibious assaults differ
radically from the preparation and conduct of battle in
ordinary conditions. These differences result from the
necessity to establish defenses on a wide frontage and usually
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out of contact with the enemy. This makes reconnaissance a
vital element of the defense network.
Soviet antilanding defense tactics have evolved from three
basic doctrinal concepts for countering amphibious forces: (1)
set up a well prepared deliberate defense as close to the
shoreline as possible without unacceptably increasing
vulnerability to prelanding nuclear or chemical strikes, (2)
maintain the capability to employ a majority of combat power
in rapid, mobile responses to unexpected breakthroughs or
landings by the ATF, and (3) concentrate firepower during the
debarkation and waterborne movement phases of the amphibious
assault in an effort to repel the landing force before it can
consolidate ashore.
As the ATF enters the amphibious operating area (AOA) the
volume of air, naval, and missile attacks would increase,
reaching maximum intensity during the debarkation of the
landing force and its movement toward the landing beaches.
The defense of a maritime flank or sea coast requires the
evaluation by ground forces of such factors as the
availability of sectors in the defense area suitable for the
landing of enemy amphibious forces, the possibilities for
positioning coastal artillery elements, and missions for the
destruction of an enemy amphibious force which can be
accomplished in cooperation with naval ships. This implies a
coordination of action by the motorized infantry elements with
that of coastal artillery and naval ships.
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The system of fire is so organized as to make maximum use
of the range of the battalion fire means with the object of
engaging the enemy landing force while it is approaching the
beach, to achieve maximum density of fire at the shore line
and to ensure reliable effect on the enemy if he manages to
land. To make maximum use of the firepower, it is initially
located as close to the waterfront as possible.
Main attention is paid to holding important objectives in
the landing-threatened direction. This requires special
attention to coordinating with the representatives of the
fleet the method of mutual identification, target designation,
and exchange of information according to the general maps;
determines places for signalmen and spotters from the
cooperating ships.
If the enemy manages to land and penetrate the defenses,
the artillery battalion fires to stop the advance inland and
towards the flanks, prevents the landing of other echelons and
prepares to give support to a counterattack of the second
echelon (reserve) of the combined-arms unit.
Ground forces also cannot rule out the possibility of the
enemy dropping an airborne force and saboteur and
reconnaissance parties behind defensive lines. The accounting
for the possibility of fleets to deliver air strikes and to
parachute troops into the defense area dictates that all
organic equipment and attached weapons of the antiaircraft
defense be prepared to repulse enemy air attacks. Positions
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for antiaircraft weapons are therefore chosen on the terrain
so as to ensure maximum cover from air attacks for the
battalions main forces.
1. MOTORIZED RIFLE UNITS 64
The motorized rifle units are the principal ground
combat elements which would defend coastal areas against an
amphibious task force. Antilanding doctrine emphasizes a well
prepared static defense at the regiment and battalion level
for the destruction of amphibious landing forces before they
can consolidate ashore or preferrably while still at sea.
While the motorized rifle regiment (MRR) appears to
the largest unit which would assume a static defense posture
under normal conditions, the basic tactical unit employed in
an antilanding operation is the motorized rifle battalion
(MRB) , which normally operates as a part of a motorized rifle
regiment (MRR)
.
If the MRR was utilized for defense, a motorized rifle
division (MRD) commander would employ one of the three MRR's
in a deliberate defense on the most likely approach of an
amphibious assault, holding the remaining two MRR's and a tank
regiment a reserve configuration should the landing force




The MRR contains organic motorized rifle, tank,
artillery, air defense, engineer, signal, chemical, and other
necessary elements to make it an organization capable of
functioning under nuclear and non-nuclear conditions. It is
100% mobile and equipped with a sufficient amount of infantry
fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers and other
transports to carry all personnel and equipment of the unit.
The basic combat elements of an MRR are three MRB's
and a tank battalion. Principle organic combat support
elements include a 122mm howitzer battalion, an air defense
and an antitank guided missile battery, a reconnaissance and
an engineer company. Additionally, an MRR deployed in a
static antilanding defense will most likely be reinforced with
two or three artillery batteries attached from higher
headquarters to form a regimental artillery group (RAG)
.
Soviet defensive doctrine calls for the deployment of
defenses in either one or two echelons. The regiment will
normally deploy in two echelons with two MRB's forward while
maintaining an MRB in reserve. If the defended beach is flat
and easy for landing forces to cross or the MRB's assigned
frontage is two to four kilometers, each first echelon MRB
will deploy in two echelons with two motorized rifle company's
(MRC's) forward and an MRC in reserve. The strong points of
the forward companies would be located approximately two
kilometers from the waters edge.
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If the first echelon strong points of the MRB main
defense area are located farther inland than 400 to 500 meters
from the water, or there are suitable offshore islands, a
reserve platoon is normally employed as a combat guard
(outpost) forward of the main defense area. The mission of
the combat guard is to employ antitank weapons, inculuding
ATGM's, to deceive the landing force in terms of concealing
the location of the forward edge of the defense area and
preventing assault amphibian vehicles (AAV) and landing craft
from breaching mine and obstacle barriers. When located on
the beach, the combat guard is placed as close to the water as
possible.
A steep beach which is difficult for the landing force
to cross or an assigned frontage of four or more kilometers
may be defended by a battalion in a single echelon. If the
situation dictates a single echelon defense, the Soviets
deploy two MRCs, with an attached tank platoon, on the assault
line and one MRC located on the flank of the least likely
avenue for the main assault. An MRP from the MRC, along with
an antitank and an engineer detachment, acts as the battalion
reserve. This reserve allows the MRB commander some
initiative in stopping minor penetrations of the battalion
defense area, but most breakthroughs by the landing force
would be countered by the MRRs reserve.
Because the MRC strong points are deployed as close to
the water as possible in a single echelon defense, a combat
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guard is not normally posted, unless there are suitable
offshore islands. Instead, two or three specially designated
antitank weapon teams within the main defense area initially
cover mine and obstacle barriers to prevent premature exposure
of the entire MRB fire system to the ATF.
Artillery, firing from temporary positions forward of
the first echelon MRCs in a two echelon defense, or just
behind the company strongpoints in a single echelon defense,
would engage AAVs, landing craft, and fire support ships at
maximum range, "walking" preplanned firing missions towards
the beach at set time intervals.
The combat guard would engage the first wave of AAVs
at maximum range, covering the withdrawal of the artillery
units to the normal firing positions within the MRBs main
defense area. Combat guard weapons would also concentrate on
AAVs which had succeeded in penetrating antilanding barriers
as well as landing vehicles and craft carrying combat engineer
elements and obstacle breaching devices. Once it became
apparent that the combat guard was not able to repel the
landing, it would withdraw along the flanks of the battalion
under cover of protective fire from the company strong points
while antitank weapons, mortars, and tank/IFV main guns would
replace the combat guard weapons as the primary sources of
defensive fire.
As the landing force approached small arms range, the
intensity of defensive fire would gradually increase to
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maximum intensity defensive fire at around 400 meters forward
of the first echelon strong points. The point of maximum
intensity defensive fire is predetermined to correspond at the
point where the landing force encounters the extensive mine
and obstacle barriers employed by the engineering units. If
the landing force penetrates this barrier and the covering
fire, and is advancing its attack toward inland objectives,
the companies continue to fight as pockets of resistance while
awaiting a counterattack from the MRR reserve. The MRR
reserve is characteristically positioned 12 to 15 km from the
forward edge of the main defense area and normally launches a
counterattack against a penetrating landing force from a line
of deployment 4 to 6 kilometers from the shoreline, usually
about 3 0-40 minutes after the landing force has landed or when
it has advanced between 1.5 and 3 kilometers inland. This
tactic allows the use of a strong mobile reserve to create
fire pockets between the forward strong points and the ability
to contain the landing force from the flanks and front in
order to either destroy it or force a withdrawal. The MRB
reserve could be used for minor penetrations into the landing
force, but its major role in antilanding defense appears to be
the neutralization of heliborne assaults against the depth of





Figure 4 depicts a two echelon defense posture identifying
the three infantry companies with their concentrated fire
points and alternate firing positions. It also identifies
reserves, artillery positions, minefields and dummy
positions.
SOURCE: SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW
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2 . TANKS"
The Soviets consider a reinforced tank battalion to be
capable of defending a coastal area up to 5 kilometers wide
and 2 kilometers deep. The reinforcement of the battalion is
normally accomplished by the attachment of an motorized rifle
company, an artillery battalion, and an engineer platoon.
The battalion usually establishes a single-echelon
static defense approximately 2 and 3 kilometers from the
waterline. The battalion reserve for this type of defense
would consist of a tank platoon, detached from one of the
companies, and a motorized rifle platoon from the attached
MRC . Initially, the reserve units form a combat guard
(outpost) at the waterline to engage the landing force at the
maximum range of their direct fire weapons and act as a
security force for the attached artillery battalion while it
is deployed in temporary firing positions forward of the tank
battalions forward edge of battle area.
Reconnaissance once again ascertains the likely
amphibious approaches, probable objectives of the landing
force, and the force size each beach can accommodate. Company
strongpoints along with temporary, main, and alternate
positions are determined and assigned for the reserve and the
attached artillery battalion based on this reconnaissance.
65 Ibid.
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Upon arrival of the ATF in the AOA, the artillery
battalion in support of the tank battalion begins firing from
temporary positions in an effort to destroy as much of the
landing force as possible while in the water. The combat
guard engages the landing craft at maximum effective range,
attempting to repulse the attack/assault, deceive the ATF as
to the actual location of the forward edge of battle (FEBA)
,
and inflict heavy casualties without prematurely exposing the
battalions fire plan to opposition air and naval gunfire
attacks. While the combat guard engages the landing force,
the artillery battalion withdrawals to the main firing
positions utilizing pre-planned rolling barrages as the
landing force moves toward the beach.
If the artillery and combat guard have accounted for
a substantial loss of landing force strength, tank companies
would move forward out of their strongpoints to within 50 to
100 meters of the waterline to conduct direct fire from the
tank main guns to stop the assault in the water. If the
landing force maintains the ability to reach the beach, the
combat guard is withdrawn under the cover of intense fire from
company strongpoints and the battalion commences maximum
intensity defense fire with tank main guns and an artillery
standing barrage as the first wave of AAVs comes ashore.
As the landing force prosecutes its assault inland,
the motorized rifle platoons move to prepared security
positions inside the tank company strongpoints to provide
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protection to the tanks and await a counterattack from the
tank regiments reserve.
The regimental reserve normally launches the first
counterattack approximately 6 kilometers from the waterline
when leading elements of the landing force have advanced 2 to
3 kilometers inland. During the counterattack, the tank
company strongpoints attempt to create crossfire pockets to
pin down the landing force and prevent it from maneuvering
against the regimental reserve. The tank battalion reserve
could be used to counter a weak penetration, although the
primary role of this reserve appears to be the neutralization
of helicopter assaults on objectives within the battalions
defense area.
3 . ARTILLERY66
Soviet tactics for the employment of field artillery
in antilanding defense emphasizes three major principles. The
first principle stresses the engagement of the afloat elements
of the ATF at maximum effective range in an effort to destroy
as much of the landing force while still at sea. The Soviets
have determined that with concentrated fire of an artillery
battalion it is possible to destroy a transport or landing
craft carrying an infantry battalion with its tanks while
still at sea, but the destruction of an infantry battalion
66 Ibid.
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with weapons after it has landed would require three times as
many artillery pieces and ammunition.
The second principle utilizes the extensive use of
detailed, pre-planned fires calculated in advance by all
batteries in the battalion assigned to defend a specific
avenue of approach, as well as those batteries located in
adjacent areas within range of the approach. Therefore, if
the battalion assigned to defend a specified avenue of
approach is disabled or destroyed, the adjacent battalion
having already calculated the firing data for that specific
avenue of approach is capable of immediately delivering the
line of fire. Finally, Soviet doctrine utilizes redundant
radio, wire, and visual communication paths for their coded
fire commands to ensure responsiveness of orders while
decreasing the vulnerability of command and control to
communications disruption.
When defending a sea coast an artillery battalion is
usually provided with radar. The position of the radar
station is chosen so as to ensure reconnaissance and fire
adjustment at maximum firing range and to observe the
waterline and coastal zone.
Firing positions are chosen according to the
characteristics of the various artillery pieces and their
targets. The first positions that the firing batteries occupy
are temporary positions located as close to the waterline as
possible. This allows for the engagement of the amphibious
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task force ships at maximum range. Additionally, these
forward positions allow the artillery units to take early
action to prevent reconnaissance and minesweeping by
amphibious forces. Batteries firing from temporary position
conduct concentrated fire at ships within range as well as the
AAVs and landing craft in assembly areas or on the line of
departure.
As the AAVs/landing craft approach the line of
departure and prepare to commence the assault, the battalion
shifts in echelon to its main firing position, located within
the depth of the defensive position. The Soviets coordinate
the artillery barrages with the arrival of AAVs and landing
craft at reefs, mines and other obstacles due to the
relatively light overhead protection of these craft in
comparison with infantry fighting vehicles designed for ground
combat. Once the landing force has succeeded in penetrating
this rolling barrage and the maximum intensity fire of the
supported MRB or tank units, the artillery battalion fires a
standing barrage at the waterline.
If the landing force begins to consolidate a foothold
ashore, the artillery units withdraw to alternate positions
towards the rear and continue to fire harassment missions
throughout the depth of the beachhead. In preparation for a
counterattack, supporting artillery conduct fire assaults
along the line of attack while heavy guns simultaneously
engage gunfire support ships of the ATF, which provide one of
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the primary dangers to the counterattacking forces. If
Soviets fail the initial counterattack, artillery units fire
standing barrages to the front and flanks of the landing
force, to prevent pursuit of the counterattack force and a
further expansion of the beachhead by the landing forces.
4. ENGINEER SUPPORT67
Engineer support is an integral part of the
antilanding defense and is particularly stressed in Soviet
doctrine. Engineer forces are organic to the Soviet ground
force structure and are often supported by naval engineer
forces that specialize in antilanding operations. These
engineer units are flexible, multimission capable, combat
support units consisting of a pontoon bridge company, a combat
engineer company, and amphibious company and a construction
company. They are equipped with a wide variety of engineering
equipment including tracked minelaying vehicles (MAV/BAV or K-
61/PTS) , bulldozers and high speed trenchers and ditchers.
These engineer units conduct the initial functions
necessary to ensure the rapid construction of fortifications,
caves and tunnels for fire weapons and combat equipment. They
also organize the installation of barriers and obstacles on




After a specific antilanding defense mission has been
assigned engineer reconnaissance elements will perform
reconnaissance to develop specific information for the
assigned defense area. Upon completion of this
reconnaissance, the plan for the engineer preparation of the
antilanding defenses is formulated placing first priority on
protective entrenchments and shelters followed by mine and
obstacle barriers. If time permits, improvements to approach
and withdrawal routes are made to facilitate rapid
reinforcement and enhance the capability to withdraw and
reoccupy the defensive position if the use of NBC during
prelanding bombardment is suspected.
5. ENTRENCHMENTS AND SHELTERS 68
Entrenchments and shelters are the first priority of
the defensive forces and are an integral part of the
antilanding doctrine at both the tactical and operational
level of military art.
Soviet doctrine utilizes trenches, pits, shelters, and
firing ports for equipment, weapons, and personnel to provide
some degree of overhead cover and concealment during air and
naval gunfire bombardment and NBC strikes. These structures
are further reinforced if possible with timber, corrugated
steel, and sandbags to enhance overhead protection during
shore bombardment. Trenches are also utilized to link squad
68 Ibid.
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positions within company strong points and as communication
trenches between platoons and observation command posts.
Trenches are created using high-speed trenching
machines or tank dosers (BTM-3 or MDK) . The Soviets also
stress the maximum use of power tools and explosives to
minimize the time required to accomplish the improvements.
Camouflage discipline at both the tactical and
operational level of military art is thorough and continuous
throughout the defensive area.
6 . BARRIERS 69
The Soviets regard engineer preparation of the defense
area as a key factor in the antilanding defense plan and rely
on barriers to account for heavy casualties and also function
as distractions to prevent landing force AAV drivers and
assault troops from avoiding covering fire. The system of
antilanding, antitank and antipersonnel engineering barriers
and obstacles on the approaches to the shore are designed to
handicap the maneuver of the landing force both on the
approaches to the landing beach and on it. They are built in
such a way so as to ensure the covering of the main areas of
the shore suitable for landing an amphibious force and of the
probable directions of the enemy advance upon landing. The
obstacles are carefully coordinated with a system of fire and
the routes of maneuver and advance of the units in defense.
69 Ibid.
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The Soviets utilize two types of barriers: mines, which are
preferred, and obstacles.
Up to 1200 antitank mines may be laid for a battalion-
sized defense in minefields designed to channel AAVs into
zones of intensive antitank fire and to cover gaps between the
combat guard temporary positions. The Soviets stress the use
of hedgehogs, reinforced concrete blocks, knife teeth, and
protective and deceptive barbed wire be integrated with the
mines to increase resistance to determined penetration
efforts. They emphasize secured, weighted foundations to
prevent movement in surf and during tidal shifts and are
acutely aware of the vulnerability of obstacles to underwater
nuclear demolitions, and therefore attempt to design and
construct obstacles difficult to counter. Additional
deceptive and defensive wire obstacles are placed throughout
the defensive zone to twart helicopter assault in potential
landing zones
.
Construction of these defenses requires an extended
period of time, usually two to five days, yet Soviet exercises
and doctrinal literature rarely considers more than a 48 hours
of warning for an antilanding defense mission. Writings
further reveal that the Soviets expect eight to 24 hours of
prelanding bombardment preparation before the landing forces
move ashore and perhaps even more given the recent Desert
Storm air campaign.
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The lack of advanced strategic or operational warning
of an amphibious assault would require a hasty antilanding
defense preparation which in Soviet doctrine calls for the
construction of unconnected and uncovered positions with few
obstacles and sparse minefields located on the most likely
avenues of approach.
G. CONCLUSIONS
Soviet military literature emphasizes the role of ground
forces in coastal defense and defense of the maritime flank.
Ground forces train for coastal defense and maintain forces
organic to the division that are capable of conducting coastal
defense
.
The combined arms aspect of Soviet doctrine is also
stressed with the total integration of all branches of the
Soviet military. The Soviet military commands a formidable
coastal defense force that is second to none. The emphasis
put forth in doctrinal writings and the modernization of the
extensive coastal forces corroborates the "defensive" posture
taken by the Soviet Union. Coastal defense and "defense of
the homeland" are integral parts of the Soviet military and
political "defensive" doctrine and will continue to be so in
the future.
While the future of the Soviet military in light of recent
developments within the Soviet Union is obscure, the
capabilities of existing Soviet ground and naval forces are
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more apparent. Command and control for antilanding defenses
appears to be moving away from the old military district
structuring and towards a republic structure where forces
could either be owned by the republic or the
union/commonwealth. Regardless of what direction Soviet
political or military doctrine might take, the Soviet military
might will remain as a powerful force capable of providing a
viable and effective means of "Defending the Homeland."
Finally, the Soviet Union's military advisory potential
can not be ignored as it is important to note that the Soviet
employment of antilanding defenses is the basic concept
witnessed by U.S. amphibious forces in Iraq/Kuwait. This
emphasizes the necessity for U.S. strategic planners to still
study Soviet antilanding doctrine in order to be better
prepared to respond to the various contingencies as outlined
under the new national security strategy.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
The fundamental role of America's armed forces is
changing. In an era where the United States military power is
declining on the Eurasian continent and where access to
overseas bases and the support for forward-based forces is
decreasing, the new national security strategy is focused on
deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and
reconstitution
.
The perpetuation of a stable world environment through a
credible military force and strong alliances will continue to
remain crucial to the survival of our Nation and our political
and economic well-being. To remain credible while enduring a
dwindling military budget necessitates a national strategy
that must be joint in nature and which requires a force
capability applicable across the broad spectrum of conflict.
The velocity with which political situations are changing in
the world today, as witnessed in the Iraq/Kuwait conflict,
requires a force structure that is able to respond to this
broad spectrum of crises anywhere at anytime with little or no
warning.
The force structure and the means by which the U.S.
accomplishes these new security goals is already changing and
will require the development of a military strategy with a
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force structure that is responsive to today's dynamic
political situation. While there is no precise model to
optimize force structure, forces must be multimission, mobile,
flexible, and capable of the precise and discriminate
application of military force.
Amphibious forces by virtue of their mobility, flexibility
and versatility, and with the ability to conduct both tactical
and operational level assaults from the seaward flank, are a
vital component of our maritime capability and new national
security strategy. They can respond to the complete range of
scenarios from forward presence to crisis response and
finally, to sustained conflict. Military planners must not
ignore the fact that the threat of amphibious operations can
also cause an adversary to deploy forces in a manner that
leaves him vulnerable in other locations and to other types of
military operations as witnessed during Desert Storm.
Amphibious forces are often the best, and sometimes the only,
way of responding with military force to an unstable or
potentially unstable situation. As such, amphibious
operations should remain as an integral part of our maritime
strategy especially with their ability to exploit sea control.
The Marine Corps has all of the characteristics of an
intervention force, in terms of balance, flexibility,
strategic mobility, and sustainability and is moving to meet
the future force requirements of the new national security
strategy.
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The Marine Corps, with is capable, mobile, and
logistically independent naval forces is organized with
sufficient flexibility to enable them to provide the U.S. with
a forward presence while maintaining the ability to respond to
crises. If the need arises the U.S. Marine Corps, through
their capabilities for forced entry operations and joint force
sequencing can provide sufficient forces for sustained
operations in a conflict situation.
The Marine Corps has developed a force structure that
maximizes their fighting capabilities through the concepts of
Marine-Air Ground Task Forces and sequencing while still
addressing the current force level cuts and the new national
security strategy.
The U.S. Marine Corps amphibious forces maintain the
ability to be in theater during a crisis to suppress possible
escalation of hostilities. If the situation deteriorates
amphibious forces can exhibit U.S. conviction to deter further
escalation and failing all else they can provide a "foothold"
for the sequencing of follow-on forces if the situation
results in a major confrontation requiring a greater American
response. Sequencing provides the National Command Authority
with the capability to respond to crises with a small, capable
force and, if the situation necessitates, maintain the ability
to secure air bases, ports, or safe zones for the augmentation
of heavier follow-on forces.
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In light of the changing threat and the reduction of
forces across the board, the U.S. is already reducing those
forces focused on the Soviet threat. The era of focusing the
majority of U.S. defense efforts on a single threat or in a
single region of the would is no longer considered a viable
option. While this is warranted and necessary, we must
cautiously, however, still assess both Soviet military
capabilities and political intentions before making any major
course changes in our own maritime programs. To maintain a
credible military the U.S. must not be so nearsighted as to
ignore the significant force and advisory potential maintained
by the Soviets.
It is evident through the examination of Soviet military
literature, exercises, and hardware that the Soviet Union
takes coastal defense seriously. The emphasis put forth in
doctrinal writings and the recent modernization of the
extensive coastal forces corroborates the "defensive" posture
taken by the Soviet Union with coastal defense and "defense of
the homeland" remaining as integral parts of the Soviet
military and political "defensive" doctrine and will continue
to be so in the future. While the future of the Soviet
military in light of recent developments within the Soviet
Union is unknown, the capabilities of existing Soviet ground
and naval forces are quite apparent. The Soviet military
commands a formidable coastal defense force that is second to
none.
96
The Soviet Union's military advisory potential can not be
ignored as it is important to note that the Soviet employment
of antilanding defenses is the basic concept witnessed by U.S.
amphibious forces in Iraq/Kuwait. This emphasizes the
necessity for U.S. strategic planners to continue their
analysis of Soviet antilanding doctrine in order to be better
prepared to respond to the various contingencies as outlined
under the new national security strategy.
It is through the study and analysis of foreign militaries
that U.S. strategic planners are able to determine the
capabilities and weaknesses of not only U.S. forces, but
foreign forces as well. The examination of Soviet antilanding
doctrine provides the U.S. with a viable benchmark with which
to assess our capabilities.
It is obvious through the examination of the Soviet
antilanding doctrine that many of the basic conditions for a
traditional amphibious assault may no longer be attainable on
today's modern battlefield. The presence of mechanized,
highly mobile enemy ground forces, high tech smart weapons,
and the ability to achieve air and naval superiority in
theater would enable enemy defenses to prevent the traditional
build-up of combat power ashore or destroy the force prior to
the breaking out of the beachhead.
Given today's surveillance capacity, there is also little
probability that an amphibious task force will achieve
strategic surprise, although operational and tactical surprise
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could be achieved through feints, maneuver, or over-the-
horizon assaults.
The modern battlefield dictates that future amphibious
operations will be more dependent on the use of deception,
real-time intelligence, and the over-the-horizon (OTH)
capability to succeed. This requires amphibious forces that
are designed to land with higher speed, from greater
distances, and from dispersed fleet formations. Over-the-
horizon capability creates problems for defending forces by
making potential landing zones difficult to anticipate and
defend, thereby increasing the ability to achieve both
tactical and operational surprise. Amphibious forces could,
with over-the-horizon capabilities, become true practitioners
of maneuver warfare.
The continued development of an amphibious over-the-
horizon assault capability is crucial due to the threat to
traditional Navy/Marine forces posed by naval mines,
precision-guided munitions, and weapons of mass destruction.
The use of naval mines and antiship missiles in the Persian
Gulf demonstrated that Third World military forces now possess
the technology to confront larger and more modern forces.
While these obstacles are not insurmountable, they necessitate
changes in current amphibious warfare doctrine, training, and
equipment
.
When considering how the United States will respond to any
overseas crisis, it is important to take into account the
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posture of its forces. Forces must be well-positioned
geographically if they are to react promptly to crises and, if
necessary, other forces must be capable of rapidly reinforcing
them.
Amphibious forces will remain one of the major means of
crisis response with it's integrated U.S. air-ground warfare
capability ashore, especially where conditions preclude timely
entry of Army and Air Force units. Military opposition to the
landing of amphibious forces will vary widely as to intensity
and sophistication dependent on the area of crisis.
The ability of amphibious forces to respond to a rapidly
developing contingency could be limited to the forward element
of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The capabilities of this
size amphibious force, although limited, would exhort the
concept of sequencing where once a beachhead or airfield have
been secured, the landing force could be reinforced rapidly by
similar units using airlift and maritime prepositioning ships
or through Army or Air Force airborne forces.
This is not to suggest that airborne forces by themselves
are the answer to a forcible entry situation that an
amphibious force can not handle. Airborne forces, by the
nature of their design for speed of deployment and surprise,
are configured to be somewhat lighter than amphibious forces.
They are also not backed up by the naval air and gunfire
support inherent in an amphibious operation, and their
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capability for both ground mobility and sustainment is
limited.
Despite the difficulty inherent in a combined amphibious-
airborne operation, the joint employment of amphibious and
airborne forces could enhance not only the size of forces
available to conduct a short notice operation, but the
capabilities as well. In an era when all services espouse the
need for joint operations, the focus of future contingency
operations should be on combined forces operations. Joint
operations in a crisis response role provides military
planners the ability to fully exploit the unique capabilities
of each and every armed force.
Military doctrine and theory is evolutionary, sometime
revolutionary, and constantly undergoing change to accommodate
new ideas, new technology, or to counter changing threats. It
is, therefore, not surprising to find or expect significant
modifications to military doctrine and theory in view of the
President Bush's Aspen speech.
Geography and the dynamic international political climate
substantiate the necessity for a strategy that is maritime in
nature. Naval forces have responded to over seventy-five
percent of all international crises since World War II. The
Navy/Marine Corps Team can provide the Unified Commanders with
a force module that can be built utilizing a variety of
deployment methods depending upon the situation.
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Amphibious forces provide U.S. decisionmakers with
considerable flexiblity when facing unexpected crises. They
are able to move unimpeded on the high seas without regard for
overflight rights, landing rights, or forward basing. During
crisis response, peacetime presence forces can loiter off the
coast of an opposing nation in international waters for
extended periods of time. The ability of maintaining an
amphibious task force off the coast of a crisis region is an
inherent characteristic of naval power projection.
From their offshore position, amphibious forces can
demonstrate "gunboat diplomacy" by intimidation, the
manifestation of which can be implied by merely assuming an
offensive posture at sea. It must also be noted that the
presence of naval forces can be used as a means of influencing
friendly nations through the same concept of "gunboat
diplomacy.
"
Finally, amphibious forces can provide a limited forced-
entry capability to facilitate the sequencing of follow-on
forces into theater or, if deemed necessary, amphibious forces
can be easily retracted from the crisis region.
Strategic planners must have the foresight to respond to
the changing military balance not only in Europe, but
throughout the world and it's littorals. Regardless of the
frequency and scale of possible amphibious operations,
military planners must be prepared for ant i -amphibious
warfare. The analysis of Soviet antilanding literature,
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military forces and equipment, and Soviet antilanding
exercises provides strategic planners with a benchmark from
which to examine our own amphibious forces. While the focus
of the new national security strategy is moving away from the
Soviet Union, the need to study Soviet antilanding doctrine is
merited due to the possibility of U.S. forces encountering
Soviet-trained enemies or the remote possibility of
contingency operations against the USSR in regional/local
wars. Finally, it is necessary for U.S. strategic planners to
continuously track Soviet antilanding concepts in the unlikely
event of a reconstitution scenario resulting in a big war with
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